More Effective Warfare: Warfare Waged Psychologically by Schaad, Michael A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-06
More Effective Warfare: Warfare Waged Psychologically
Schaad, Michael A.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 









 Thesis Advisor:         Hy Rothstein 
 Second Reader:         Doowan Lee 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  More Effective Warfare: Warfare Waged 
Psychologically 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Michael A. Schaad 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number _______N/A_________.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The Powell Doctrine for waging war was generally focused on the use of overwhelming physical force to defeat the 
enemy.  Destroying enemy combatants and capabilities faster and more severely than the rate at which they can inflict 
losses has traditionally resulted in victory.  Consequently, kinetic operations have always been at the forefront.  
Despite this predominance of kinetic operations, history has shown that technologically superior, militarily advanced, 
and numerically overwhelming forces are sometimes defeated by ragtag groups of a few hundred guerrillas with 
inferior combat capabilities.  Rather than attempting to convince our enemies through the use of violent action—
which targets their physical well-being rather than their mental decision making—there is a more effective way to 
wage war: psychologically.  By exploring case studies of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the neo-Taliban, this thesis 
examines whether resequencing psychological and kinetic operations, at various times throughout a conflict, will 





14. SUBJECT TERMS Psychological Operations, PSYOP, Military Information Support Operations, 
MISO, Information Operations, IO, Strategic Communications, Warfare Waged Psychologically, 
Unconventional Warfare,  UW, Special Operations Forces, Insurgency, Terrorism, Influence, Indirect 
Approach, Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban, neo-Taliban, Israel, Kinetic, Non-kinetic 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
147 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
MORE EFFECTIVE WARFARE: WARFARE WAGED PSYCHOLOGICALLY 
 
 
Michael A. Schaad 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., Central Washington University, 1999 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 


























Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The Powell Doctrine for waging war was generally focused on the use of overwhelming 
physical force to defeat the enemy.  Destroying enemy combatants and capabilities faster 
and more severely than the rate at which they can inflict losses has traditionally resulted 
in victory.  Consequently, kinetic operations have always been at the forefront.  Despite 
this predominance of kinetic operations, history has shown that technologically superior, 
militarily advanced, and numerically overwhelming forces are sometimes defeated by 
ragtag groups of a few hundred guerrillas with inferior combat capabilities.  Rather than 
attempting to convince our enemies through the use of violent action—which targets their 
physical well-being rather than their mental decision making—there is a more effective 
way to wage war: psychologically.  By exploring case studies of Hezbollah, Hamas, and 
the neo-Taliban, this thesis examines whether resequencing psychological and kinetic 
operations, at various times throughout a conflict, will create stronger, more synchronized 
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The Powell Doctrine for waging war is historically based on the use of physical 
force to defeat the enemy.  Destroying enemy combatants and capabilities faster and 
more severely than they can do to you has traditionally resulted in victory.  Consequently, 
kinetic operations have always been at the forefront, whether it is laying siege to a castle, 
a cavalry charge, an infantry assault, or close air support. These types of operations have 
played major roles in combat due to their destructive nature, which results in a serious 
blow to the enemy’s capabilities.  Although these actions do have a psychological 
dimension—instilling fear and weakening resolve—their main purpose is to kill more of 
the enemy before they have an opportunity to inflict the same or greater damage on you.  
Subordinate to these types of kinetic operations have been psychological operations; 
diminishing the enemy’s resolve, destroying their will to fight, and seeding their mind 
with feelings of futility; ultimately, destroying the enemy’s desire to fight and their 
effectiveness as soldiers.1 
Despite this predominance of kinetic operations, history has shown that 
technologically superior, militarily advanced, and numerically overwhelming forces are 
sometimes defeated by ragtag groups of a few hundred guerrillas with inferior combat 
capabilities.  Hezbollah provides just one example of how victory can be achieved, at a 
fraction of the cost, against a regional power.  Hezbollah did not rely on conventional 
military thinking when planning their operations that heavily influenced Israel’s 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, and again in 2006.2  Instead, they combined 
the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare and psychological operations with one twist; the 
kinetic operations supported, and were synchronized with, the psychological objectives in 
order to achieve the greatest impact on their enemies and potential supporters.  This 
                                                 
1 Ron Schleifer, "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah Versus 
Israel," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 1 (Jan, 2006): 3. 
2 Schleifer, Psychological Operations, 8. 
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method has proven effective, not only by Hezbollah but also by Hamas, and its aim is to 
undermine the will of the enemy rather than have to fight and defeat them on the 
battlefield. 
Put differently, placing psychological and kinetic operations in a symbiotic 
relationship, where at times the psychological objective may direct the kinetic operation 
and at other times the kinetic operation dictates the psychological response, will result in 
a more demoralized enemy force, higher enemy desertion rates, less population support 
for the enemy, increased support from the population towards friendly forces, and 
ultimately fewer American lives lost.  Colonel William Donovan believed in and 
advocated just such a strategy over 70 years ago.  According to Colonel Alfred H. 
Paddock, Jr.: 
Donovan’s concept of psychological warfare was all-encompassing.  The 
first stage would be ‘intelligence penetration,’ with the results, processed 
by [research and analysis], available for strategic planning and 
propaganda.  Donovan called propaganda the ‘arrow of initial penetration’ 
and believed that it would be the first phase in operations against an 
enemy.  The next phase would be special operations, in the form of 
sabotage and subversion, followed by commando-like raids, guerrilla 
actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements.  All of this 
represented the softening-up process prior to invasion by friendly armed 
forces.  Donovan’s visionary dream was to unify these functions…thereby 
forging ‘a new instrument of war.’3 
No longer do we live in a time when simply killing one’s enemy spells victory.  
According to Sun-Tzu, “Preserving the [enemy’s] army is best, destroying their army 
second-best. Preserving their battalions is best, destroying their battalions is second-
best…Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of 
excellence.”4  Seldom do we see opposing forces pitted against each other in a zero-sum 
game of power as was witnessed in the Second World War.  Today, warfare is largely 
irregular, asymmetric, and based on a strategy of persistence and attrition. The enemy is 
                                                 
3 Alfred H. Paddock and National Defense University Press, US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: 
Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952 (Washington, DC: National Defense University 
Press, 1982), 6. 
4 Sun-tzu, The Art of War = [Sun-Tzu Ping Fa], trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (New York: Barnes & Noble, 
1994), 177. 
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entwined with the population, receives their support, and confronts us at a time, manner, 
and place of their choosing.  Enemies use guerrilla tactics that allow them to engage a 
numerically superior force and then fade away into the population, while maintaining the 
advantage.  According to the U.S. Department of the Army, we “measure outcomes in 
terms of effects on populations” rather than attrition of enemy military forces.5  
“Conflicts [are] much more likely to be fought among the people instead of around the 
people.  This fundamentally alters how soldiers can apply force to achieve success in a 
conflict.”6  In this light, Jervis is correct to argue that to modify the actions of others, 
“judge how others are perceiving them, and predict how others will interpret their 
behavior, states have to understand the beliefs and images others hold, which may be 
different from those held by the state.”7  Since how we measure victory, within the rubric 
of conventional wars, has changed (according to Army doctrine),8 as well as how kinetic 
operations are applied (fighting among non-combatants), it is time to re-evaluate our 
methods for conducting war.  Rather than attempting to convince our enemies through the 
use of violent action—which targets their physical being rather than their mental decision 
making capacity—I posit that there is a more effective way to wage war: warfare waged 
psychologically. 
B. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether resequencing psychological and 
kinetic operations, at various times throughout a conflict, can increase effectiveness in 
war.  Specifically, if all military actions were evaluated for their psychological 
implications, prior to execution, would it create stronger, more synchronized and 
believable messages, thus increasing efficiency and effectiveness in war?  Since today’s 
war is a “war of attrition where there are no actual winners and losers, psychological 
                                                 
5 Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, FM 3-0, Change 1 Operations (February 
2011), 1-4. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/FM3-0/FM_3-0_C1_(WEB)1.pdf. 
6 Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, FM 3-0, Change 1 Operations, 1–4. 
7 Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 33. 
8 Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, FM 3-0, Change 1 Operations, 1–4. 
 4
warfare plays a large role.”9  If we can successfully make war more effective and less 
costly, we will have an advantage over enemy combatants while simultaneously 
improving the likelihood of continued support from our domestic population.  This 
advantage will more likely result in a complete win where the enemy has been pushed 
past his breaking point, control has been established over the political environment, and 
the social and political factors responsible for the insurgency have been effectively 
resolved.  Our enemy’s motivation to resist (mental) will be eliminated rather than just 
his means, or opportunity (physical).10  Conducting warfare psychologically will allow us 
to achieve victory at a fraction of the economic cost while sacrificing fewer lives on the 
battlefield.  Additionally, we will stand less chance of losing support from the American 
public (something our enemies prey upon as a weakness), and we will have a greater 
probability of creating allies, rather than enemies, in the process.  This style of warfare is 
where Washington, and our Generals, have faltered most severely.11 
C. HYPOTHESIS AND SCOPE 
It is my hypothesis that synchronized psychological and kinetic operations will 
result in warfare waged in a more effective and efficient manner than current modes of 
warfare.  Within this thesis, I will test the hypothesis by evaluating several case studies. 
The scope of this thesis will include a broad examination of several operations 
against three criteria: the use of psychological warfare by at least one side, the timing of 
psychological warfare (pre or post-conflict), and the resonance of narrative.  In any 
                                                 
9 Guy Bechor, "Scare Tactics," Ha'Aretz, December 15, 1996. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Articles/1996/SCARE+TACTICS+-+15-Dec-96.htm. 
10 Gordon H. McCormick, "The Complete Win," in Gangs and Guerrillas: Ideas from 
Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, eds. Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein (Monterey, California: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 3–5. 
11 Michael Rubin, "Are We Playing For Keeps?," Wall Street Journal (February 27, 2006). 
http://www.meforum.org/898/are-we-playing-for-keeps. 
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conflict there are at least three, distinct target audiences: friendly,12 enemy, and neutral.13  
I will examine the enemy’s means to resist, which is the dependent variable in my thesis. 
What I seek to explore in this thesis is a way to meld conventionally accepted 
methods into an irregular option with greater effectiveness.  To embrace this irregular 
option will require a paradigm shift that embraces innovation and creativity.  To be sure, 
many will not respond kindly to an irregular option.  As Dr. John Arquilla states: 
[The] current mindset of the American military, which seems to have a 
fixation for conventional operations and the offensive, is based on the 
military’s response to industrialization some 150 years ago….That 
fixation is unfortunate, because American military culture has deep roots 
in irregular warfare…We must hope that our appreciation for the special 
effect of irregular operations will deepen as we move into an era in which 
the number of irregular conflicts is likely to increase.14 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will examine the following questions:  
1.  Does influence over the behavior of a target audience lead to more effectively 
achievable political outcomes? 
2.  Is a strong narrative fundamental to waging war effectively and efficiently? 
3.  Do convincing actions support, and lend credibility to, the narrative? 
4. Does preemptive and premeditated psychological warfare lead to quicker 
battlefield results? 
The conjectured relationship among these questions is illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                                 
12 Although U.S. Army doctrine forbids the use of military information support operations (MISO - 
formerly psychological operations (PSYOP)) against citizens of the United States (United States Army 
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, FM 3-05.30 Psychological Operations, April 2005), 
1–12.) I will include them as they play an integral role in the support, and therefore the success, of war.  I 
do not intend to examine the methods for engaging the American public, nor the challenges associated with 
doing so. 
13 Schleifer, Psychological Operations, 2. 
14 John Arquilla, "The Confederacy could have Won-Unconventionally: A Thought Experiment for 




Figure 1.   The strategy to achieve a more effective form of warfare 15 
Within the literature in the field of warfare, there is a continuum for the 
application of psychological operations on the battlefield: no psychological operations, 
conducting psychological operations as shaping operations, and waging warfare 
psychologically.  This continuum is portrayed by Figure 2 where at the low end there is 
no employment of psychological operations, the high end is where warfare is conducted 
psychologically, and somewhere in the middle are psychological operations conducted as 
                                                 
15 When waging warfare psychologically, the “preemptive/premeditated psychological warfare” step is 
critically important and “credible messages reinforcing kinetic actions” serve to support the initial 
messages.  When psychological warfare supports kinetic actions, the “credible messages reinforcing kinetic 
actions” become the critically important piece, and consideration is given to the “preemptive/premeditated 
psychological warfare” step. 
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shaping operations16 in support of kinetic operations (today’s standard).  Since it is 
largely recognized, by today’s military, that psychological operations provide added 
value, I will exclude the low end of the spectrum (no psychological operations) from my 
analysis.  This leaves two points on the continuum: the current and the proposed. 
 
Figure 2.   A continuum for the employment of psychological actions in war 
As previously stated, psychological operations forces are currently employed 
“primarily as shaping operations that create and preserve opportunities for decisive 
operations.”17  Within this context, their role is “to assist military commanders in 
articulating their objectives, to help identify the decision makers who can promote or 
interfere with these objectives, and to recommend appropriate courses of action to 
properly influence them.”18  This view, widely-held throughout the military, and 
promulgated by Army manuals on doctrine, subordinates psychological operations to 
kinetic operations.  Unfortunately, believing it necessary to destroy one’s enemy on the 
field of battle in order to be victorious is no longer always true. 
Extensive academic work in the field of psychology has already been conducted 
surrounding the topics of influence and narratives.  According to this research, a narrative 
is simply a story that assists our ability to recall events, motivates us to act, and tempers 
                                                 
16 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, FM 3-05.30 
Psychological Operations, 1–2. 
17 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, FM 3-05.30 
Psychological Operations, 1–2. 
18 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, FM 3-05.30 
Psychological Operations, 1–4. 
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our emotional responses to events.19  However, a narrative is much more.  It is the 
justification—moral and ethical—for conducting war; it is meant to inform and influence 
both the domestic and the foreign target audiences as to why war is the only remaining 
option and what must be done in order for hostilities to end.  It is critical that the 
narrative precede all other actions, and send a clear and enduring message.  The 
establishment of a strong, credible narrative is vital in that it can produce monumental 
effects on frames, with the ability to sway, manipulate, and persuade individuals, as well 
as organizations.  Within social movement theory, framing is a way to “assign meaning to 
and interpret, relevant events and conditions in a ways that are intended to mobilize 
potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize 
antagonists.”20  As Snow et al. point out, “Frame alignment...is a necessary condition for 
movement participation.”21  Frame alignment, as defined by Snow et al., is “the linkage 
or conjunction of individual and SMO [social movement organization] interpretive 
frameworks.”22 Said another way, it is the level of connectedness and congruency 
between an individual’s and a SMO’s orientations, beliefs, values, goals, activities, and 
ideology.  In order to build a strong narrative, Snow et al. theorize that there are two key 
sets of factors.  The first factor “involves the content or substance of proffered framings 
and their degree of resonance with the current life situation and experience of the 
potential constituents.”23  This is the degree to which individuals can relate to various 
frames based on their experience and the frame content.  The second factor is the 
“variation in the degree of frame resonance, such that the higher the degree of frame 
resonance, the greater the probability that the framing effort will be relatively 
                                                 
19 William D. Casebeer and James A. Russell, "Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 
'Counter-Narrative Strategy'," Strategic Insights IV, no. 3 (March, 2005), accessed August 22, 2011. 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Mar/casebeerMar05.html. 
20 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization," in From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, eds. 
Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi and Sidney G. Tarrow (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1988), 
198. 
21 David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation," American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (August, 1986): 467. 
22 Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, 467. 
23 Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, 477. 
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successful.”24  Simply put, the more an individual can relate to a frame, the more likely 
they are to adopt it and claim it as their own. 
Credibility is an essential prerequisite to frame resonance and therefore frame 
alignment, which results in influence.  Without credibility, the argument is defeated 
before it is even presented.  Untrustworthy messengers or sources “undermine the 
potential frame resonance of a message by leading those audiences to question the source 
of information and argument.  Those with sufficient reputations, in contrast, will elicit 
trust and enhance prospects for successful message dissemination.”25 
Credibility can also be increased when a narrative is reinforced by and integrated 
with kinetic operations, and other actions seen to be inconsistent with the story.  
However, the utility of psychological warfare has been overshadowed by the 
predominance of kinetic warfare.26  Several authors theorize that we have been 
approaching the study of the art of war from the wrong perspective, i.e. by destroying the 
enemy’s physical body (as is done in kinetic operations) we are able to defeat them.  
Unfortunately, this method often does little to change the will of the enemy, which is the 
real objective in war.27  In fact, kinetic operations may galvanize the support and will of 
the enemy.  As Hess and Martin note, “Repression sometimes can lead to greater 
movement mobilization: repressive events that are perceived as unjust have the potential 
to generate enormous public outrage against those seen as responsible.”28  The 
proponents of this theory propose that by engaging the mind, rather than the body you are 
able to “conduct wars in nonlethal, noninjurious [sic], and nondestructive ways.”29  This 
tactic has been used repeatedly by smaller, less advanced forces against more powerful 
                                                 
24 Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, 477. 
25 Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad: Intramovement Framing Contests and Al-Qaeda's Struggle 
for Sacred Authority," International Review of Social History 49, no. 00208590 (2004): 163-164. 
26 Richard Szafranski, "Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill," in In Athena's Camp: Preparing for 
Conflict in the Information Age, eds. John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 
1997), 395. 
27 Szafranski, Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill, 397. 
28 David Hess and Brian Martin, "Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events," 
Mobilization: An International Journal 11, no. 2 (June, 2006): 249. 
29 Paul E. Valley, "From PSYOP to MindWar: The Psychology of Victory" (Presidio of San 
Francisco, California), 3. http://www.xeper.org/maquino/nm/MindWar.pdf. 
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and technologically superior adversaries, and there is no reason the same principles 
cannot be applied in opposite, so long as the American public is able to quell their  
unwarranted fear of the term psychological operations (or variations thereof).  Supporters 
of this theory believe its employment will provide one of the “cheapest and best security 
investments we could make in the developing world.”30 
E. METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDIES 
The focus of the thesis will be a micro level analysis of three case studies: 
Hezbollah during the war with Israel in 2006, Hamas during Operation Cast Lead at the 
end of 2008, and the neo-Taliban from 2005–2006.  I will attempt to discern whether in 
warfare it is beneficial to consider the psychological implications of actions prior to their 
execution; therefore, necessitating the resequencing of psychological operations at 
various times in warfare in order to achieve a complete win. 
My overall methodology is a controlled comparison of these three historical case 
studies with the intent of testing the applicability and validity of the arguments 
established in Section D.  First, each case study will be separately evaluated against 
several independent variables: the narrative, the enemy’s strategy, themes used in 
psychological operations, and the synchronization between psychological and kinetic 
operations.  These independent variables have varying degrees of influence on the 
dependent variable of affecting the enemy’s willingness to resist.  Next, a cross-sectional 
comparison of the like-independent variables will be conducted to demonstrate which 
variables, and which case studies, achieved the greatest effect on the dependent variable.  
Lastly, it is my aim to assemble the strategies of employing psychological operations in 
war and demonstrate that warfare waged psychologically lends itself to a better return on 
investment, a key component of any successful strategy. 
In Chapter II, I will discuss the case of Hezbollah and Israel during the 2006 
Lebanon War, and how Hezbollah incorporated psychological warfare into their battle 
                                                 
30 William F. Johnston, "Neglected Deterrent: Psychological Operations in 'Liberation Wars'," 
Military Review (May, 1968): 90. 
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plans against the larger and technologically advanced Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).  
Israel not only failed to incorporate psychological warfare into their operations, but, and 
possibly more importantly, failed to counter Hezbollah, allowing Hezbollah to gain the 
initiative.  Israel lost their domestic popular support base, and Hezbollah succeeded in 
driving them back across the border.  With this case I will show the significance of 
waging warfare psychologically, the impact it can have against an adversary, and the 
power it possesses to sway the masses. 
Chapter III will delve into Hamas; a similar case study as Hezbollah where a 
smaller, technologically inferior force benefited from the combination of psychological 
and kinetic operations in an attempt at defeating Israel and establishing an Islamic 
Palestinian State.  This case introduces elements that demonstrate, despite a strong 
narrative and sound information campaign plan, the more technologically advanced party 
can still be defeated by a weaker adversary with a less comprehensive information 
campaign plan.  With their strategy, Hamas gained support from the international 
community, specifically the Arab world, and was able to somewhat dictate Israel’s 
actions during Operation Cast Lead.  The Hamas case study should add weight and 
credibility to the ideas and tactics of waging warfare psychologically discussed in the 
Hezbollah case study.  
Chapter IV is a case study of the neo-Taliban,31 from 2005 to 2006, and how their 
tactics are influenced by the information gleaned from both previous cases.  The neo-
Taliban is a technologically inferior force, whose tactics and synchronization of 
psychological and kinetic operations have evolved greatly over the years.  The neo-
Taliban case study demonstrates the critical importance of a comprehensive narrative that 
resonates with the populace as the basis of an effective military strategy.  Second to this 
is the synchronization of psychological and kinetic operations on the battlefield. 
Throughout the case studies I will address the applicable counterarguments.  The 
prevailing counterargument is a general, but unstated, attitude that we as Americans have 
                                                 
31 The term neo-Taliban is used to draw a distinction between the Taliban toppled by the U.S. in 2001 
and the insurgency which emerged afterwards—the neo-Taliban.  The neo-Taliban espouses a significantly 
different ideology and is comprised of myriad groups of actors. 
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always waged war by applying force on force and for the most part, it has proven 
successful.  The United States possesses the world’s preeminent military force and it is 
unmatched in its strength, so what reasons are there for adjust our current way of waging 
war?  I will debate this argument, as well as others that claim “only smaller forces can 
successfully wage war psychologically,” or “only forces that have the home turf 
advantage will be successful in waging war psychologically.”  Ultimately, these 
counterarguments will be established as falsehoods. 
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II. HEZBOLLAH’S STRATEGY OF WARFARE WAGED 
PSYCHOLOGICALLY 
The first section of this chapter provides a brief overview of Hezbollah’s history 
in an effort to better understand their leaders’ mentality and the organization as a social 
movement.  The next section delves into the strategy Israel chose to employ in order to 
defeat Hezbollah.  Hezbollah’s narrative, the themes they selected for employment, and 
the means they used to disseminate their messages to each target audience is described in 
another section.  The subsequent section of this chapter examines the synchronization 
achieved by Hezbollah between their psychological and kinetic operations, followed by 
the effects of these actions on Israel’s willingness to resist.  Finally, the chapter is 
concluded with insights to Hezbollah’s actions against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon 
War. 
A. BACKGROUND 
On April 18, 1983, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was attacked by a suicide bomber 
driving a pickup truck loaded with explosives.  Sixty-one people were killed and an 
additional one hundred twenty were wounded.  Six months later, on October 23rd, the 
U.S. Marine and French barracks were destroyed by another car bomb.  Two hundred 
forty-one Marines and fifty-eight French soldiers were killed, along with another hundred 
individuals wounded.  A week later, on November 4th, the Israeli Army Headquarters in  
Tyre was attacked.  Twenty-nine soldiers were killed and tens more were wounded.32 
These attacks signaled the entrance of Hezbollah33 onto the world stage as a terrorist 
organization. 
                                                 
32 "Timeline of Hezbollah Violence," Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, 
accessed August 12, 2011, http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=2&x_outlet=118&x_article=1148.; 
Kirit Radia, "Beirut U.S. Embassy Bombing 25 Years on," ABC News, accessed 1 August, 2011, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=4682319&page=1.; Eyal Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon: At 
the Crossroads," Middle East Review of International Affairs 1, no. 3 (September, 1997), accessed August 
6, 2011. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a1.html. 
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Hezbollah started as a terrorist organization funded by Iran and has evolved into 
what can be classified today as the premier Islamic activist organization, albeit violent, in 
the world.  It is headed by a seven-member shura council, maintains a highly active 
military wing, and relies heavily on eight units—social, Islamic health, education, 
information, syndicate, finance, external relations, and engagement and coordination—
for the bulk of its extensive organizational work.  Through the coordinated employment 
of their various elements, Hezbollah developed as a highly effective SMO with 
considerable sway within Lebanon and surrounding areas. 
The “Party of God” pioneered the evolution of twenty-first-century warfare with 
an ambitious, two pronged approach: the synchronization of psychological and kinetic 
operations on the battlefield, and the application of information operations beyond the 
confines of the battlefield, to include a foray into politics, education, and social services 
in order to influence public perception and opinion.  Within this strategy the weapons are 
virtual: video clips shown on television, articles written in papers, pictures displayed on 
the internet, live radio broadcasts, published books, hard-copy media press releases, and 
sermons.  As stated by a senior member of Hezbollah’s battle information department, 
“Members of the resistance have come to the conclusion that while a bullet can wound a 
soldier or two, a picture can wound all of Israeli society, which is the most significant 
aspect of the conflict.”34  Hezbollah understands the significance of their strategy and the 
advantage it provides against their opponents.   
Hezbollah was founded in 1982, in Lebanon’s breadbasket—the Bekaa valley—
by the Iranian government35.  Formed during the first Lebanon war, after Israel invaded 
Lebanon in an attempt to eliminate Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) safe havens, 
Hezbollah was primarily considered a militant resistance organization whose stated 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 There are several spellings of Hezbollah used in the western world; they include Hizballah, 
Hizbullah, Hezballah and Hizb’allah.  I have chosen to use this spelling (Hezbollah) because during my 
research I have found it to be the most common.  Alternative spellings are retained when utilized by other 
sources. 
34 Reuven Erlich and Yoram Kahati, Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds 
(Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration 
Center (IICC), June, 2007). http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e_0607.pdf. 
35 "Timeline of Hezbollah Violence," Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America. 
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objectives, as outlined by their 1985 “open letter,” were: Israel’s withdrawal from 
Lebanon and subsequent “obliteration from existence,” the liberation of Jerusalem, the 
withdrawal of the United States, France, and their allies from Lebanon, and the 
opportunity for the Lebanese people to determine their fate by selecting a system of 
government (although they “urged” choosing the Islamic system).36  Since its formation, 
Hezbollah garnered a significant base of support from the Shi’a community in southern 
Lebanon. 
Subsidized by Iranian money, Hezbollah’s “militant resistance” materialized in 
the form of countless terrorist activities throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s.  In 
their “open letter,” Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the April 1983 attack on the U.S. 
Embassy in Lebanon, as well as the October 1983 attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in 
Beirut.  Over the years, their tactics have included car bombs, kidnappings, murders, and 
the hijacking of civilian airliners.  In October 1997, fourteen years after their formation, 
the United States recognized and consequently listed Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization. 
In 1989, Lebanon ratified the Taif Agreement which called for the disbanding of 
all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and “provided the basic mechanism for ending 
the civil war.”37  Despite this agreement, Hezbollah survived and began to transform 
itself into a nationalist organization with growing interest in politics, communication, 
education, and social welfare.  With significant support from Iran, Hezbollah began 
building a network of schools, mosques, food banks, job centers, clinics, hospitals, youth  
                                                 
36 Hizballah, Nass al-Risalah al-Maftuhah Allati Wajjahaha Hizballah ila al-Mustad'afin fi Lubnan wa 
al-'Alam, February 16, 1985. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA351867. 
37 Hassan Krayem, "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement," American University of 
Beirut, accessed August 12, 2011, http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html. 
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programs, private businesses, and local security organizations.38  Their welfare centers 
cater to tens of thousands of families and their information network is unrivaled by any 
other terrorist organization.39 
In 1992, Hezbollah participated in the Lebanese elections and won eight seats in 
Parliament.  Although this was only a small fraction of the Parliament’s 128 seats, it was 
viewed as a glowing victory for Hezbollah.  More recently, Hezbollah participated in the 
2009 national elections where they won ten seats in Parliament and two cabinet posts in 
the Ministries of Agriculture and Administrative reform.40  Since its emergence onto the 
world stage, Hezbollah has undoubtedly become the world’s preeminent terrorist 
organization, adroit at waging warfare psychologically in an effort to vanquish the “evil” 
Israelis from Lebanese soil—something they achieved in 2000 and again in 2006. 
Under the astute leadership of Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, the 
Hezbollah of today wears a different face than the Hezbollah of the 1980s and 1990s.  
According to Hilary Anderson,  
They took Terry Waite hostage, they are funded by Iran, they are Islamic 
extremists to the letter, or so the image goes…they surely should have 
been dressed in black, and had long, disapproving beards.  But they 
weren’t.  They were young, smiling men in neat, camouflage uniforms.  
Some of them were even wearing spectacles.  Some of them spoke 
English.  No-one mentioned fighting for God or a religion.  They said they 
simply wanted to drive Israelis from their land.41 
Israel’s strategy for defeating Hezbollah through the use of advanced technology 
and sheer firepower has been stymied.  Time and again IDF forces have attacked and 
pushed into Lebanon, and time and again they are thwarted.  Not even the advanced 
                                                 
38 Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress 
(Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2011). http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf.; 
Michael Rubin, "Are We Playing For Keeps?," Wall Street Journal (February 27, 2006). 
http://www.meforum.org/898/are-we-playing-for-keeps. 
39 John F. Burns, "Remade Militant Group Learns Press Kits and Web Sites have their Uses," New 
York Times, February 12, 2000. 
40 Addis and Blanchard, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, 9. 
41 Hilary Anderson, "Eyewitness: Meeting Hezbollah Fighters," BBC News, accessed August 10, 
2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/733678.stm. 
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technologies of their tanks, aircraft, or helicopters have proven effective at destroying 
Hezbollah.  This case study examines Hezbollah’s tactics, techniques, and procedures 
during the 2006 Lebanon War,42 also known as the 33-Day War, from 12 July, 2006 to 
14 August, 2006, in an attempt to discern the utility of waging warfare psychologically—
something Hezbollah has achieved great success with. 
B. ISRAEL’S STRATEGY OF KINETIC PREEMPTION 
In an effort to better understand Hezbollah’s actions and responses, it is critical to 
first understand Israel’s strategy.  With a more robust and technologically advanced 
military, Israel opted for a strategy of deterrence and preemptive attack, an approach they 
have utilized in other conflicts as well.  This section will analyze the Israeli strategy and 
its effectiveness at successfully combatting Hezbollah. 
Over the years, Israeli strategies resulted in little success for dealing with 
Hezbollah.  During the 2006 war with Lebanon, Israel initially relied on a strategy of 
deterrence43 and when that failed they employed an offensive, preemptive strategy, aimed 
at achieving their goals as quickly as possible.44  This aggressive strategy was only 
possible due to their robust military might with its heavy reliance on advanced 
technology, superior firepower, and speed of maneuver.  Unfortunately, Hezbollah’s 
asymmetrical style of warfare rendered Israel’s strategies ineffective. 
Adding to Israel’s failure was the fact that their political and military leaders were 
overconfident of their capabilities and underestimated Hezbollah’s determination.  As 
Janice Gross Stein notes,  
Underestimation by a defender may seriously impair its capacity to 
respond should an adversary choose to challenge deterrence.  If leaders 
                                                 
42 U.N. Security Council resolution 1701 declared a ceasefire to the war on August 14, 2006.  
However, the official end date was when the Israeli government lifted the air and naval blockades of 
Lebanon on September 8, 2006. 
43 Dov Waxman, "Between Victory and Defeat: Israel After the War with Hizballah," The Washington 
Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Winter, 2006-07): 30. 
44 Clive Jones, "Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and the War in South Lebanon 1985-97," Small 
Wars and Insurgencies 8, no. 3 (December, 1997): 84–85. 
http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592319708423186. 
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underestimate the capabilities…of a challenger, if they are overconfident 
in the effectiveness of deterrence, they may well be surprised, caught 
unawares, and unprepared.  They may fail to reinforce deterrence before a 
challenger is fully committed to military action, thus forfeiting the 
opportunity to avoid war.45 
Israel again fell into this exact trap.  These strategic miscalculations led to Israel’s failure 
to meet their objectives in the war with Lebanon, not once, but multiple times, and by 
default Hezbollah won. 
 Hezbollah’s attack on the Israeli Naval Ship (INS) Hanit, a Sa’ar 5-class corvette 
ship, within the first 72 hours of the war is a prime example of Israel’s overconfidence in 
its superiority.  As the ship was patrolling Lebanese waters off the coast of Beirut, it was 
struck by an Iranian C-802 radar-guided missile.  The missile exploded over INS Hanit’s 
flight deck, killing four sailors and causing massive damage to the vessel.  Israel’s 
investigation following the incident revealed that a junior officer had shut down the 
ship’s radar and Barak missile defense system without the knowledge or approval of the 
commander.  However, the larger and more significant issues are that the ship’s 
commander did not believe the ship was in any danger, and the Israeli Naval Intelligence 
was unaware that Hezbollah possessed such anti-ship missiles; therefore, the danger was 
“unrealistic and imaginary.”46  This is a clear instance of Israel’s overconfidence in their 
military superiority and failure to correctly judge the capabilities of their challenger. 
As a country surrounded by enemies, Israel has generally relied on a military 
strategy of deterrence, both directly in its negotiations with countries, and indirectly 
through dealings with intermediaries.  However, many influential right-wing members of 
Israel’s government believed their strategy of deterrence throughout the region lacked 
credibility and therefore their deterrent capability was questionable.47  There was also a 
strong belief that Israel’s credibility had to be restored in order to increase their 
                                                 
45 Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from 
Jerusalem," in Psychology and Deterrence, eds. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein 
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985): 62. 
46 Hanan Greenberg, "Officers Reprimanded Over Hanit Vessel Incident," Y Net News, January 1, 
2007. 
47 Waxman, Between Victory and Defeat, 29. 
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deterrence ability in the region and with Hezbollah.  Upon Israel’s withdrawal from 
Lebanon in 2000, the Israeli government issued stern warnings that should there be any 
violations of the UN-sanctioned border agreement, retaliation would be swift and harsh.48  
Israel believed these threats were credible due to their “power to hurt”49 Lebanon, and 
subsequently Hezbollah.  However, the threats failed to have the desired deterrent effect 
because Israel continually failed to enforce their threats.  Time and again Hezbollah 
conducted cross-border attacks and Israel did nothing.  Thus, Israel’s deterrence policy 
had no teeth, and Israel had no bite. 
Advocates of Israel’s deterrence policy made assumptions that ultimately proved 
false.  They believed that Iran and Syria had the power to control Hezbollah and would 
do so if confronted by enough pressure,50 and that the Lebanese government would reign 
in Hezbollah if enough weight was exerted on Lebanon itself.51  Additionally, using Iran 
to pressure Lebanon in order to control Hezbollah was problematic because Israel had no 
direct line of communication with Iran and nothing to use as leverage.52  Deterrence 
failed from the outset, so Israel sought to use Syria to control Hezbollah.  This too failed.  
Israel’s leadership had no intentions of using military force to coerce Syria and instead 
called for a renewal of peace negotiations.53  Upon realizing that pressuring Iran and 
Syria to deter Hezbollah was useless, Israel opted for a strategy of coercion against 
Lebanon. 
Israel tried to compel the Lebanese government to exert control over the rouge 
militia fighters operating from within Lebanon’s borders.  Israel blamed Lebanon for 
allowing Hezbollah to launch its July 2006 attack, which resulted in the capture of two 
                                                 
48 Shmuel Bar, "Deterring Nonstate Terrorist Groups: The Case of Hizballah," Comparative Strategy 
26, no. 5 (December, 2007): 469. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a3.html;. 
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(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1–34. 
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IDF soldiers and the killing or wounding of five more—from Lebanese “sovereign” soil.  
Ehud Olmert, Israel’s Prime Minister, sought to deter Lebanon when he threatened, “the 
Lebanese government will be responsible for the consequences [of the attack].”54  
Nasrallah’s claim after the war that he “did not see any risk, even one chance in a 
hundred, that the abduction operation would lead to a war on this scale”55 makes it clear 
that Olmert’s threats were too late and Israel’s earlier tactics of deterrence were unclear 
and lacked credibility. 
Israel’s leadership believed by attacking Lebanese infrastructure and civilian 
targets, the Shi’a population of Lebanon would blame Hezbollah and rally in opposition, 
thus pressuring the Lebanese government to stop Hezbollah’s activities.56  However, this 
tactic backfired and instead of blaming Hezbollah, the Shi’a community blamed Israel 
and actually banded together in support of Hezbollah as their protectors, thus 
nationalizing Hezbollah and adding support to the movement.57  Consequently, a cruel 
paradox was discovered by Israel: “The more force is used to retaliate, the more fuel is 
added to the terrorists’ cause.”58 
Israel is militarily superior to Hezbollah in many ways: technologically, 
manpower, equipment, and training.  This advantage allowed Israel to rely heavily on its 
military, and it did so on two distinct occasions, launching major offensives against 
Hezbollah: Grapes of Wrath and Accountability.59  Both operations sought to undermine 
Hezbollah’s military capability by destroying their supply lines, supply depots, training 
camps, and ultimately, their military units.60  Strikes against Beirut, bombardments 
against Tripoli, attacks on Hezbollah’s administrative buildings, and the employment of 
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the newly created, special forces unit “Egoz” did little to halt the determination of 
Hezbollah.  Even the direct targeting and killing of Hezbollah’s leader, ‘Abbas Musawi, 
in 1992, failed to achieve the decapitating effect on the organization that  Israel assumed 
would occur as a result of his death.61 
Israel’s strategies failed to achieve any of their essential objectives, incurred a 
cost of over $1 million per day, and allowed Hezbollah to emerge as the victor.62  Instead 
of deterring Hezbollah from launching attacks against settlements in Northern Israel, 
Israeli actions began a cycle of violence where Hezbollah’s rocket attacks would result in 
Israeli retaliation, causing civilian casualties. Hezbollah used this situation to garner 
additional public support, followed by more rocket attacks against Israel.  Israel failed to 
protect its citizens from the Katyusha rockets, failed to prevent guerrilla attacks, and 
failed to sway the opinions of the Lebanese population against Hezbollah.  Olmert “failed 
to bend the Lebanese government to his will [and] failed to secure the unconditional 
release of the two soldiers63 whose capture by Hizbullah had triggered the war.”64 
C. THEMES STRESSED BY HEZBOLLAH IN WARFARE WAGED 
PSYCHOLOGICALLY 
A narrative is a compelling story that others can identify with which explains 
what an organization is, its beginning, vision for the future, and rational or justification 
for the organization’s actions.  It is critical to have a succinct yet thorough narrative in 
order to provide direction for the organization, garner additional support, and maintain 
the credibility of the organization’s actions.  Without a narrative the organization’s 
members may lack the cohesion, drive, and vision required to successfully navigate the 
uncharted waters of progress.  On the other hand, a strong, credible narrative can produce 
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monumental effects on framing key issues and events, with the ability to sway, 
manipulate, and persuade individuals, as well as organizations. 
A frame is simply a way of seeing and understanding an event.  It is also a way to 
“assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in a ways that are 
intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, 
and to demobilize antagonists.”65  As Snow et al. point out, “Frame alignment...is a 
necessary condition for movement participation.”66  Frame alignment is defined as “the 
linkage or conjunction of individual and SMO interpretive frameworks.”67 Said another 
way, it is the level of connectedness and congruency between an individual’s and a 
SMO’s orientations, beliefs, values, goals, activities, and ideology. 
1. Narrative 
Hezbollah’s collective action framing process begins with the story of a 
downtrodden group of individuals, repressed by the West and forced to use violent 
tactics—even though they claim their preference is open dialogue—for the creation of an 
Islamic state.  The downtrodden individuals assert they have been repressed by Israel, 
America, and France and will continue fighting until Israel is eradicated from the face of 
the earth. 
There are several core framing elements to the collective action frame proffered 
by Hezbollah, the first being diagnostic framing.  As their “open letter” claims, the 
victims are “all the world’s downtrodden peoples and all those who fight our enemies and 
who are eager not to harm us, be they individuals, parties or organizations.”68  The 
flexibility of Hezbollah’s wording produces a collective action frame that is as inclusive 
as possible, despite the fact that the scope is predominantly relevant to the Shi’a 
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community.  Another feature of Hezbollah’s collective action frame is problem 
identification and direction.  In their “open letter,” repression is identified as the problem 
and the remedy openly advocated in their attributional frame is armed confrontation 
against the West, specifically Israel, America, and France, as a remedy.69   
Although Hezbollah’s framing calls for violent confrontation against the West, 
their manifesto advocates the use of persuasion and dialogue for the establishment of 
their Islamic state in Lebanon.  It says, “Therefore, we urge adoption of the Islamic 
system on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not the basis of forceful 
imposition, as some people imagine.”70  Hassan Nasrallah confirmed this non-violent 
approach to establishing an Islamic state when he said: 
The solution, in our opinion, is the establishment of an Islamic state in 
Lebanon and beyond, but this does not mean we must be hasty and impose 
such a solution by force on our country and countrymen…We prefer to 
wait for the day that we succeed in convincing our countrymen by means 
of dialogue and in an open atmosphere that the only alternative is the 
founding of an Islamic state.71 
By using frame amplification in their manifesto and speech, Hezbollah is able to produce 
a greater resonance with a broader support base for their collective action frame.  The 
non-violent democratic approach taps into people’s core beliefs and values that violence 
and tyranny are evil, and it seeks to amplify these beliefs.   
Hezbollah claims their story “must end with [Israel’s] obliteration from 
existence,” and their manifesto states there will be no recognition of “any cease-fire 
agreement, any truce or any separate or non-separate peace treaty with [Israel].”72  
However, since 2001 Hezbollah ceased to embrace this view and instead shifted its 
rhetoric to promoting Arab solidarity and Lebanese nationalism—goals which have 
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yielded more support.  By extending their original frame from a select group of 
downtrodden individuals to a broader constituency, Hezbollah seeks to encompass 
important, yet external issues and concerns within their collative action frame as a SMO.  
They have effectively expanded their circle of inclusion to all Lebanese while 
simultaneously adopting additional grievances and concerns.  This has allowed Hezbollah 
to greatly expand their organizations membership and to provide more support to the 
issues that most affect their new members.  The cultural similarity between all Arabs 
presents itself as an opportunity for Hezbollah to extend their SMO’s motivational frame 
and results in a political opportunity to unite all Lebanese under the rubric of nationalism. 
2. Themes 
Unlike Israel, Hezbollah elected to utilize a psychological approach to war.  They 
have a “veritable system of psychological warfare, headed by a psychological warfare 
unit that specializes in the promotion of the doctrine and the image of the militia. This 
unit specializes in targeting civilian non-combatants, regardless of whether they are 
Israelis or Arab-Muslims.”73  Not only does Hezbollah’s psychological warfare unit 
specialize in targeting civilian non-combatants, they have effectively targeted the IDF 
and South Lebanese Army (SLA) as well. 
As noted by Schleifer, psychological warfare consists of “delivering messages by 
nonviolent methods, to target audiences, domestic and neutral as well as among the 
enemy, with the aim of furthering the war effort.”74  All three of these target audiences 
have been influenced, with varying degrees of success, by Hezbollah.  Their messages, 
all reinforcing the organization’s espoused goals, can be categorized into two distinct 
themes: garnering support for their cause, and Israel’s inevitable defeat. 
Hezbollah’s support theme, demonstrated incredible effectiveness for swaying the 
opinions of the various target audiences and for solidifying support.  Unity was one of the 
main messages espoused under this theme.  The solidarity of Lebanon was continually 
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reinforced by messages claiming Hezbollah acted on behalf of all Lebanese.  The SMO 
emphasized the legitimacy of their actions on behalf of a united Lebanon, and the 
proclamation that their path was justified by righteousness.  Therefore, Lebanon would 
prevail in defeating the invading infidels.  The messages crafted by Hezbollah 
encompassed all Lebanese, to include Christians, Sunnis, and Shi’a, so much so that in 
one instance a Christian woman gave Hezbollah a $15,000 check and declared that the 
money should be used for purchasing Katyusha rockets.75 
Hezbollah is adept at using non-lethal actions to sway the support of vast swaths 
of the Lebanese population, especially when reinforced by their extensive social service 
network.  Within the first two months after the Israeli’s 1996 Grapes of Wrath campaign 
created significant damage in Lebanon, Hezbollah responded by quickly repairing over 
5,000 homes and paying compensation to 2,300 farmers.76  They were responsible for 
rebuilding roads, schools, and Lebanese infrastructure, as well as meeting the social 
service requirements of individuals by providing services such as electricity, sewer, gas 
stations, and hospitals.  Hezbollah’s benevolence did not stop there.  Over a four year 
period, their financial aid committee spent over $90 million to assist the families and 
dependents of its fighters killed or wounded in combat actions.77  A Hezbollah 
spokesman summed up their actions by stating, “Hezbollah is not only missiles and 
fighting; if it were, the people would have turned away from us long ago.”78 
Not only has Hezbollah skillfully used their support for the cause theme to win 
over the Lebanese people, but they have also proven this theme’s effectiveness against 
the Israelis and the SLA.  Hezbollah routinely targets poorly paid and inadequately 
trained SLA soldiers with messages seeking their defection, and entices them with 
monetary compensation and a pardon.  The families of these soldiers are also targeted by 
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Hezbollah in order to place additional pressures on the soldiers, and persuade them to 
defect. 
The second theme used by Hezbollah is one of Israel’s inevitable demise.  This 
theme aims to impress on Israelis the enormous price they will pay for continuing the 
fight, and the fact that the cost will far outweigh any reward they might ever hope to gain.  
Under this rubric, messages are crafted so as to remind Israelis that the war will be 
protracted and Hezbollah fighters possess unrelenting resolve to see it through to victory.  
Hezbollah is adept at pointing out that Israel’s goals and objectives are muddled while 
Lebanon simply wants Israel’s departure from their country.  This serves to drive a 
wedge between segments of the Israeli population.  Probably the most effective messages 
against Israel were those fashioned around the idea of guilt. 
Hezbollah quickly discovered and exploited the Israeli’s apprehension toward 
graphic television images.  Videos, produced by Hezbollah’s psychological operations 
unit and al-Manar showing Hezbollah fighters ambushing Israeli convoys or assaulting 
Israeli outposts and raising the Hezbollah flag were often broadcast by Israeli television 
stations.  Graphic images of mangled bodies, wounded children, and the destruction of 
war were also broadcast with chilling effects.  Hezbollah’s psychological campaign 
resulted in the formation of several Israeli anti-war social movements—Four Mothers 
being the most prominent—that demanded their government’s unilateral withdrawal of 
all forces from Lebanon.  Additionally, there was a major downturn in Israeli public 
opinion and support for the war, which is attributable to Hezbollah’s intense 
psychological warfare campaign.  
Each of the themes constructed by Hezbollah contained unique, mutually 
supporting arguments and were disseminated through a variety of medium to produce a 
constant bombardment against the target audience.  In a war where “public opinion, 
perception, and persuasion were the real determinants of victory,”79 Hezbollah 
effectively used these two psychological warfare themes to successfully target, influence, 
and ultimately modify the behaviors of all three target audiences.  
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3. Broadcast, Print, and Internet Channels 
Hezbollah began its foray into the information operations realm with the 
establishment of a radio station (Sawt al-Islam) and a weekly paper (al-Ahed).80  With 
these two simple tools, Hezbollah began influencing its members and surrounding 
audiences.  Desire to spread their ideology and garner support of a larger constituency led 
them to expand into additional media formats. 
Due to Iranian backing, and Hezbollah’s heavy reliance on the internet to spread 
their ideology, it only made sense for Hezbollah to cultivate this capability.  Their 
internet exposure began in 1997 with two websites; one for propagating their beliefs and 
one to garner support.  Today, Hezbollah’s internet network encompasses anywhere from 
fifteen to twenty different websites, whose content and quality, according to a study by 
the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC), “far exceeds those of local 
terrorist organizations.”81 
Hezbollah’s flagship media enterprise, al-Manar, began as a land-based television 
station in the 1990s and has since expanded into the primary tool for influence.  Ten 
years later, in May 2000, al-Manar launched a satellite television channel aimed at 
influencing public opinion concerning Israel.  According to Ali Dahir, the station’s first 
general manager, 
Hezbollah has founded the station to express the views of the 
oppressed…and advocate a mass media that respects Islamic moral and 
Muslim traditions.  The goal of our station is to show the facts, focus on 
our hostility and hatred for Israel and its racist government system, whose 
downfall we see as one of our fundamental principles.82 
Due to the ubiquity of a satellite signal, al-Manar’s newest television station reaches 
areas previously inaccessible to the land-based station and provides Hezbollah with the 
means to transmit their messages to a greater number of people worldwide. 
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Over the past 30 years, and with massive monetary support from Iran, Hezbollah 
built an extensive, sophisticated, and comprehensive collection of communication tools; 
assets that would rival those of most third world countries.  Today, Hezbollah boasts six 
journals (al-Ahed “the covenant,” al-Bilad, al-Wahda, El-Ismailya, al-Sabil, and al-
Intiqad “the promise”), three radio stations (Sawt al-Islam “The Voice of Islam,” Sawt al-
mustadh’afin “The Voice of the Oppressed,” and al-Nahar “The Light”), two television 
stations (al-Manar “the beacon” and al-Fajr “dawn”), several publishing companies (Dar 
al-Hadi, Markaz Bequiyyat Allah al-‘Azam lil-Dirasat, Imam Khomeini Cultural Center, 
and one run by the al-Mahdi Scouts—Hezbollah’s youth movement) and countless 
internet-based websites83 (al-Muqawamah “The Resistance,” Wa’ad “The Promise,” and 
numerous sites promoting their media outlets and social organizations).84 
D. SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN HEZBOLLAH’S PSYCHOLOGICAL 
AND KINETIC ACTIONS 
According to Schleifer, “It was not conventional military thinking that determined 
what Hezbollah would attack and why…When deciding on and planning an operation the 
organization would calculate its psychological impact of the enemy.”85 
Hezbollah knew from the outset they lacked the military capability to combat 
Israeli forces in a conventional battle, and therefore was forced to rely on a strategy that 
provided them with an advantage.  Hezbollah demonstrated this strategy by ensuring 
psychological and kinetic operations were completely synchronized and their 
organization did not depend too heavily on successful kinetic military engagements.86  
Instead, Hezbollah’s combat media services, composed of guerrillas trained as 
cameramen, were integrated with every unit and existed as part of Hezbollah’s order of 
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battle.87  Their mission: to capture the operation on film for exploitation.  Hezbollah’s 
leadership appears to have a grasp on this symbiotic relationship, as evident by one 
officer’s statement: “On the field we hit one Israeli soldier.  But a tape of him crying for 
help affects thousands of Israelis.  Initially our tapes were used to galvanize our local 
audience.  Then we realized the impact of our amateur work on the morale of Israel.”88  
Now, video clips and printed bulletins are ready for distribution to the press only thirty-
five minutes after the completion of a mission, often beating Israel’s acknowledgment 
that anything even occurred.89 
Hezbollah uses ubiquitous information networks to its advantage.  Their 
spokesmen use personal organizers to check the facts of an ambush prior to discussing it 
with the press, videotapes recorded by their cameramen are provided to news agencies to 
broadcast on the evening news (even in Israel), and suicide bombers are immortalized as 
their faces are disseminated to target audiences everywhere via the internet.  After 
Israel’s defeat in May 2000, it was noted that “Seventy-five percent of Hezbollah’s war 
was the videotapes,” something that had a dramatic effect on influencing public 
perception.90 
1. Military Operations 
We are not a regular army and we will not fight like a regular army. 
- Hassan Nasrallah91 
Since its inception in 1982, and specifically after its publication of the “open 
letter,” Hezbollah’s guerrilla forces have been embroiled in the ongoing Israeli-Lebanese 
conflict in an attempt at “rescuing Lebanon from subservience, expelling the Zionist 
occupation, and adopting a system which the people establish of their free will and 
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choice.”92  In the 1982 Lebanon war when Israel invaded Lebanon, Hezbollah’s efforts 
contributed to the Israeli withdrawal three years later.  As Israel was withdrawing the IDF 
from Lebanon, they established the “security buffer zone” in the south of Lebanon.  The 
Lebanese people viewed this as an injustice and Hezbollah continued its resistance.   
In 1993 Israel responded to Hezbollah’s armed resistance, which had just killed 
five IDF soldiers within the buffer zone, with a massive attack against Lebanon in an 
attempt to disrupt their actions.  The military campaign ended in a short-lived ceasefire 
which banned targeting civilians on either side.  When an Israeli attack killed several 
civilians outside the security zone, Hezbollah retaliated with incessant rocket attacks,93 
several of which landed in northern Israel; although, Hezbollah denies responsibility and 
blames radical Syrian-backed Palestinians.94  The rocket attacks sparked fierce retaliation  
by the Israelis in a sixteen day battle known as operation Grapes of Wrath.  In May 2000, 
Israeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon in a U.S. brokered agreement in which 
rockets would not be fired across the border into civilian areas.95  
Although Israeli forces withdrew from Lebanon, sporadic fighting continued with 
cross-border attacks by both sides, and on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fighters attacked an 
IDF patrol.96  During that attack two Israeli soldiers were captured in an effort to force 
Israel’s hand and negotiate a prisoner exchange.97  Israel’s response was an all-out war 
against Hezbollah with blockades and attacks into Lebanon, something Nasrallah had not 
expected.98  The war lasted thirty-three days and ended with Israel’s humiliating 
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withdrawal of its forces from Hezbollah-held Lebanon—without their captured soldiers.  
Hasan Nasrallah declared this a “divine victory” for Hezbollah.99  
Since the end of the thirty-three day war, Hezbollah and Israel have continued to 
experience their “standard” border clashes.  In July 2008, Israel freed five Lebanese 
prisoners in exchange for the remains of the two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah in 
2006.  Although Hezbollah’s military activities may have subsided, and their terrorist 
actions have waned, by no means does this signal Hezbollah’s willingness to abandon 
military operations. 
E. EFFECT ON ISRAEL’S WILLINGNESS TO RESIST AND THE 
LEBANESE MOTIVATION TO PERSIST 
Hezbollah’s ability to synchronize its lethal and non-lethal actions resulted in a 
multiplication of effects.  Rather than just killing a few individuals on the battlefield via a 
roadside bomb, Hezbollah was able to effectively circulate and recirculate the same 
graphic image of IDF deaths to a majority of the populations in both Lebanon, as well as 
Israel.  The effect was disastrous for Israel.  “The broadcast of Hezbollah film footage on 
Israeli television was a major success.  The film reached almost every Israeli household, 
many of which certainly raised questions about the need to stay tangled in the Lebanese 
mud.”100  Hezbollah meticulously described, with their still photographs and video 
footage, for its Israeli audience the price they would have to pay for going to war, in 
terms of human life, military equipment, and security.101 
Hezbollah, reverting back to the terroristic tactics of their formative years, 
sometimes conducted snatch and grab operations with the specific aim of abducting 
Israeli soldiers for ransom.  Currently, there are still seven Israeli soldiers declared as 
missing in action (MIA), with Ron Arad (the Air Force navigator captured in October 
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1986) being the most recognizable.102  One such kidnapping operation—Hezbollah’s July 
2006 attack and subsequent kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers—had dramatic and 
unintended consequences—the start of the thirty-three day war. 
Hezbollah relied heavily on the use of carefully planned roadside bombings as a 
method of engaging convoys, but not for the sole purpose of creating casualties.  They 
did so with the intent of instilling fear and creating uncertainty, thus compelling the IDF 
and SLA forces to limit their freedom of movement.103  The Israelis responded by 
restricting soldiers to fortified outposts, increasing combat tour durations, and canceling 
all weekend leave and passes during the soldier’s tour of duty for fear of losing soldiers 
on the hazardous roads.104  Unexpectedly, this played into Hezbollah’s hand by creating 
extensive periods of boredom filled with mundane and repetitive tasks which led to 
complacency in the IDF soldiers.105  Adding to the soldiers’ feelings of isolation, the 
Israeli military leadership banned all cell phone use (previously used by soldiers to call 
home to family and friends) due to paranoia that Hezbollah was able to intercept the calls 
and gather intelligence.106  Hezbollah’s view that a roadside bomb’s effects could be 
amplified psychologically proved correct on multiple levels. 
Hezbollah’s extensive use of suicide bombers allowed the war to be framed as a 
Manichaean battle between good and evil, which permitted Hezbollah to easily amass a 
large pool of willing volunteers to become martyrs.  With intense indoctrination, these 
would-be martyrs had a reduced fear of death, which provided them with the advantage 
in close-quarters combat.107  Additionally, the establishment of the Martyr’s Institute, 
which provided stipends and tuitions for the martyr’s families, greatly increased 
individual’s willingness to martyr themselves.108  As noted by Nasrallah, “The fighter’s 
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strength and superiority does not stem from the type of weapon he carries, inasmuch as it 
stems from his will…and his advance towards death.”109 
Hezbollah’s extensive reliance on videotapes served the organization well.  In 
1997, a security official of the SLA was killed by one of Hezbollah’s roadside bombs.  
Israel immediately responded by falsely claiming the man was a civilian.  Following 
Israel’s declaration, Hezbollah released and broadcast video showing the man “getting up 
in a bedroom, coming out to the balcony to have his morning coffee, getting dressed, 
putting his combat webbing on, picking up his automatic rifle and coming out to meet his 
bodyguards” before getting killed by Hezbollah’s roadside bomb.110  With this single 
video, Hezbollah cast doubt on the Israeli government and garnered credibility for their 
own organization. 
Not only was Hezbollah adept at synchronizing psychological and kinetic actions 
throughout its combat operations, but they continued to deliberately apply kinetic actions 
in support of psychological objectives.  At the conclusion of the thirty-three day war, 
Hezbollah’s social unit immediately set out to assist the hundreds of thousands of 
refugees, displaced from southern Lebanon, in returning to their homes—in utter 
disregard of IDF broadcasts warning non-combatants to refrain from returning to the 
south.  Hezbollah ensured the refugees were provided with food, water, and supplies, and 
were welcomed back by victory banners and song.111  As the refugees began to flow 
south, Hezbollah’s construction unit immediately swung into action and began 
documenting losses, clearing the rubble, and rebuilding houses (whether owned by 
Christian or Muslim), schools, and infrastructure, something no other organization was 
able to duplicate.  The American strategist Pat Long noted, “A proof of winning on the 
battlefield has always been possession of that battlefield when the shooting stops.”112   
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F. CONCLUSION 
Although Hezbollah may have started off as a simple terrorist organization, they 
have evolved into a highly effective Islamic activist organization, with nationalistic 
tendencies, aimed at removing Israel from Lebanese society.  As part of their 
evolutionary process, they have refined and perfected an unorthodox, psychological 
approach to warfare which equalizes the battlefield when pitted against an opponent with 
advanced technology, a greater quantity of forces, and superior firepower.  In the war 
against Israel, Hezbollah’s asymmetric strategy proved to be more effective at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels when compared to Israel’s strategy, which relied 
heavily on deterrence, and once it was clear that had failed, overwhelming superiority in 
technology and firepower.113 
Hezbollah followed a simple formula in creating their strategy of warfare waged 
psychologically.  They started off with a strong, uncomplicated, and easily understood 
narrative that could be internalized by others outside of the organization.  The narrative 
explained Hezbollah’s beliefs and their reasoning for being at war with Israel and the 
West.  This straightforward and effective narrative made it possible to preemptively 
disseminate credible messages in an effort to convince and influence the three target 
audiences.  Reinforcing of these messages were preplanned and synchronized kinetic 
actions followed up with additional psychological messages aimed at bolstering the 
kinetic actions.  This cycle allowed Hezbollah to gain trust and support, and amass a 
large following.  Once the population’s confidence was obtained, Hezbollah was able to 
influence them, thus resulting in an effective unconventional warfare waged 
psychologically strategy. 
As noted by Henry Kissinger, “The conventional army loses if it does not win.  
The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.”114  In an asymmetric conflict where the counter-
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state, or guerrilla organization, must not lose in order to win, the state must actively seek 
alternative methods besides a reliance on larger, better armed, and technologically 
superior forces.  Hezbollah’s reliance on information age technologies to influence and 
coerce public opinion, perception and support allowed them to not only “not lose,” but to 
thwart Israel’s efforts and strategy thereby preventing them from winning.  This example 
of warfare waged psychologically has significant implications for the future of irregular 
warfare, should we be willing to take note. 
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III. HAMAS AND EXPLOITED PSYCHOLOGICAL 
OPPORTUNITIES 
This case study analyzes the events surrounding Israel’s Operation Cast Lead 
(December 2008–January 2009) in an effort to compare the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures utilized by Hamas to those examined in the previous case study.  The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the background of Hamas so as to better understand the 
organization and their roots.  Subsequently, Israel’s strategy is analyzed in an effort to see 
if, and how, they were able to achieve success over Hamas.  The next section outlines the 
major themes exploited by Hamas in an effort to modify perceptions and rally support 
against Israel.  An analysis of the psychological aspects of Hamas’ plan will be followed 
by a section examining the synchronization between the psychological and kinetic actions 
on the part of Hamas in an effort to determine if, and why, Hamas was successful against 
a superior foe.  Then I will discuss whether Hamas’ strategy achieved any noticeable 
effects against Israel, and if so, to what degree did that play into the end result of 
Operation Cast Lead.  Lastly, I will close the chapter with a section summarizing Hamas’ 
successes and failures as they related to Israel’s accomplishment of its mission.   
A. BACKGROUND 
Hamas can trace its roots back to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) which 
was founded in 1928 as a Sunni religious, political, and SMO advocating against colonial 
rule by the British.  In 1967, during the Six-Day War, Israel captured the territories of the 
West Bank, East Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, and Jordan, 
fostering resentment amongst the Palestinians in the now Israeli-occupied regions.  On 
December 8, 1987, an Israeli Army truck ran over several protesting Palestinians, killing 
four and injuring seven.  Many Arabs believed this was not an accident, but rather 
retribution for the stabbing of a Jewish salesman two days earlier.115  The violent 
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Palestinian uprising that followed, later known as the intifada,116 or the first intifada, 
spurred Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (a key leader of the MB) and six others to found Harakat 
al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya.  Also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, Harakat 
al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya became the paramilitary wing for the MB.  Hamas, (an 
acronym which roughly means “zeal”)117 as the SMO is better known, began to develop 
its doctrine and structure that would guide the revolutionary organization. 
By creating Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, the older, more cautious 
leadership of the MB were able to separate themselves from the younger more militant 
Palestinians that sought a dedicated resistance organization.118  Restructuring the MB and 
establishing a dedicated armed resistance wing allowed for a distinct separation of tactics.  
The MB focused on its long standing social institutions and organizations while Hamas 
concentrated on the militant armed struggle against Israel.  This all changed in 1991 
when Fatah, Hamas’ rival faction and largest party of the PLO, began negotiating in the 
U.S.-led peace process.  Those opposed to the peace process were left with only one 
choice—the MB—even if they were opposed to the tactics employed by the 
Brotherhood’s Hamas wing.  The wave of new members resulted in a more 
heterogeneous and expansive constituency for Hamas, who by now had surpassed the 
MB as the central Islamist SMO, with Hamas’ militant leaders now at the reins of the 
entire organization.119 
On August 18, 1988, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya solidified its doctrine 
by publishing its Islamic covenant (charter)—edited and approved by Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin.  The covenant contains 36 articles which describes the SMO’s ideology and lays 
the groundwork of their narrative.  In one of the first paragraphs, Hassan al-Banna120 is 
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quoted as saying “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, 
just as it obliterated others before it.”121  The covenant maintains a radical Islamic 
viewpoint which proffers that the “land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf122…[that] should 
not be given up.”123  It asserts that there is “no solution for the Palestinian question 
except through Jihad,” and that “peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in 
contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement.”124  The charter 
stresses the spread of Islamic consciousness through education, science, media, youth, 
sheikhs, and Muslim men and women, with the goal of raising the banner of Jihad against 
the Jews. 
Turmoil in the early 1990s brought structural and leadership changes to the 
Islamic Resistance Movement.  In 1991, Ziccaria Walid Akhel formed the Katib al-
Shahid Izzedin al-Qassam125 Brigades, also known as the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades 
(IDQB), whose mission was the kidnapping and execution of suspected Israeli 
collaborators.  After the confinement of numerous members of Hamas’ senior 
leadership126 and the deportation of 415 Islamist activists, the organization began 
restructuring itself to better allow for a dispersed leadership.127  It was divided into three 
wings: social, militant, and political, with the leadership segmented into internal and 
external.  The hardliners dominated the external leadership and served as militia leaders 
while less aggressive individuals served as internal leadership.128  This move resulted in 
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the increased autonomy and decentralization of the Qassam Brigades, which allowed 
many members within the Brigades to act without authorization from the leadership.  
Additionally, the restructuring caused increased tension between the internal and external 
leadership elements while simultaneously creating opportunities for politicking that were 
previously non-existent.  In 1992 Hamas beat Fatah in the elections for Chambers of 
Commerce in Gaza, Hebron and Ramallah.  The following year, Hamas again beat Fatah 
by winning all nine seats in the Bir Zeit University student council, ending Fatah’s 16 
year reign in a region dominated by secular nationalists.129 
By the mid-1990s, after rejecting the Oslo Peace Process and standing in 
opposition to the Palestine National Authority (PA)—controlled by Yasser Arafat’s Fatah 
faction—Hamas began to enforce its doctrine through increased militant actions.  In April 
1994 the organization conducted its first car bombing, killing eight, and its first suicide 
bombing, killing five.130  In response to the 1996 killing of their master bomb-maker, 
Yehiyeh Ayyash, widely known as “the engineer,” Hamas intensified their attacks and 
bombings against Israel.  The new terror tactics typically resulted in border closures, 
increasing the feelings of occupation among Palestinians, adversely affecting the 
Palestinian economy, and providing Hamas the opportunity to gain greater support as the 
champion for Palestinian rights. 
On September 28, 2000, the violent skirmishes between Palestinians and Israelis 
reached a crescendo when Ariel Sharon, and a delegation from the Likud party, made a 
well-publicized and highly controversial visit to the Temple Mount (also known as 
Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem.  Riots ensued, and thus began the al-Aqsa intifada.131    
Fatah and the PA were weakened by the ensuing events while Hamas experienced 
increased doctrinal autonomy; freedom to conduct its militant activities and fortify its 
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political position as a key player.132  Acceptance of suicide bombing swelled from 20 
percent to well over 70 percent (tacit approval of Hamas’ doctrine), and the Qassam 
Brigade’s tactics became the model for other groups.133  Israel’s response was swift and 
harsh but only served to polarize the Palestinians even further, leading to a downward 
spiral of violence over the next half-decade. 
After the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, Hamas 
found itself the target of American security and intelligence agencies, lumped together 
with all other radical Islamist movements.134  However, Hamas’ ideology is different 
than that of al-Qaeda.  They are not linked to al-Qaeda, nor do they intend to conduct a 
“global jihad.”135  Hamas maintained a low profile in the post-9/11 world and despite 
requests from al-Qaeda did not support Osama bin Laden.  This prevented the Islamic 
Resistance Movement from being viewed by the rest of the world—with the exceptions 
of Israel and the U.S.—as linked to al-Qaeda and prevented the Palestine question from 
being sidelined. 
A year after Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was killed in a targeted airstrike (March 22, 
2004), and after a subsequent transition in leadership from hardliners to moderates, 
Hamas made the public announcement that they would participate in the Palestinian 
legislative elections—a drastic deviation in their doctrine.  Ten months later, on January 
25th, 2006, the Palestinian world was rocked by a political “tsunami” when Hamas, led 
by Khaled Meshal, won 72 seats in the PA’s 132-member parliament—a victory with 
structural implications for the organization.136  For the first time since 1968, Fatah was 
deposed as the dominant party in transparent, democratic, and internationally approved 
elections.  However victorious, Hamas’ unity government with Fatah, and the Mecca  
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accord, failed to bring forth any noticeable progress, partly due to the lack of recognition 
bestowed by the “Quartet.”137  Israel’s Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, immediately 
announced: 
There will be no recognition of a Palestinian government with the 
participation or under the control of Hamas unless three conditions are 
met: the Hamas charter is changed to recognize the state of Israel’s right to 
exist as a Jewish state; total dismantling of all weapons and a total 
cessation of terrorist activity; and acceptance of all agreements signed 
between the PA and the State of Israel.138 
However significant Hamas’ victory, it failed to gain control of Mahmoud Abbas’ PA. 
In 2007, Hamas orchestrated a takeover of the Gaza Strip and seized power from 
Fatah; although, Fatah retains control over the West Bank.  In an effort to quell the 
escalating rocket attacks and border clashes, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against 
Gaza at the end of 2008.  On January 18, 2009, after 23 days of fighting, a truce was 
signed between Hamas and Israel.139 
B. ISRAEL’S STRATEGY—“WAR 2.0” 
Israel took to heart the lessons learned from the 2006 Lebanon War—creating a 
new doctrine and a revamped strategy.  This time around, their stated objective was 
ensuring the safety of the Israeli people by halting the rocket attacks into Israel.140  Israel 
never mentioned a timeline, and their actions were vastly different from those of the 2006 
war and thus, more positively received by the international community.  The Winograd 
Commission’s report may have provided the external impetus Israel  
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required in order to decisively act on and implement the lessons learned from the failures 
of the 33-Day War.  Whatever the reason, Israel presented a vastly different, and 
undoubtedly much more successful, strategy during Operation Cast Lead. 
One of the Winograd Commission’s recommendations that Israel implemented 
was the establishment of an information and propaganda unit141 in order to coordinate 
public perception across all media outlets, to include horizontal media.142  According to 
the Israeli Prime Minister’s office, the resulting unit—established in the first half of 
2008—the National Information Directorate (NID), was responsible for managing 
hasbara (Hebrew for “explanation”) through the “direct[ion] and coordinat[ion] in the 
information sphere so that the relevant bodies present a unified, clear, and consistent 
message.”143  One of the directorate’s first tasks during Operation Cast Lead was to 
ensure its core messages were clearly translated to the media: Hamas was responsible for 
breaking the ceasefire with Israel, Israel’s objective was the safety and security of its 
population, and the terrorist group Hamas was targeting Israeli civilians.144  Additionally, 
it has been claimed that Israel sought to restore its deterrent capability after its failure in 
the 2006 Lebanon War against Hezbollah.145  During the first few days of Operation Cast 
Lead, the NID was so successful at coordinating hasbara that the world media began 
parroting the Israeli messages verbatim. In other words, it was in control of the narrative 
for the conflict. 
Israel’s narrative, based on victimhood and self-defense, is similar to that of 
Hezbollah in 2006, and Hamas.  All three claimed to be defending their territory and 
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people against an ever more violent and oppressive enemy.  Israeli governmental officials 
from the top down all stayed on message in what proved to be a successful attempt to 
present the world with a cohesive narrative explaining Israel’s limited, and very specific, 
goals in Gaza—there was no mention of completely destroying Hamas.  President 
Shimon Peres told the press “We will not accept the idea that Hamas will continue to fire 
and we shall accept a cease-fire.”146  Similarly, Defense Minister Ehud Barak told the 
Knesset “The goals of this operation are to stop Hamas from attacking our citizens and 
soldiers.”147  When talking to reporters, Oved Yehezkel, Israel’s Cabinet Secretary said, 
“The goal is to deal a serious blow to the terrorist infrastructure of the Hamas [sic].  The 
operation at this point is not expected to stop the fire, but we expect that it will be 
reduced,”148 and Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman Andy David said “My message is 
to say that the aim is very simple: that what has happened in the last eight years [rocket 
fire in southern Israel] will not happen in the future.  The aim is to change the reality.”149  
It is a testament to Israel’s planning and coordination that the numerous governmental 
offices strictly adhered to the pre-coordinated talking points in order to explain the goals.  
Conversely, there was an apparent lack of information conveyed to the media 
when it came to announcing a timeline for the operation.  No promises were made as to 
when the fighting could be expected to end.  Foreign Minister Tzipi Livini explained to 
the Cabinet that the “intensive diplomatic activity in recent days is aimed at deflecting the 
pressure for a cease-fire to allow enough time for the operation to achieve its goals.”150  
Barak was quoted on several occasions as saying the operation will continue until all its 
goals are met.  Israel was correct in their assessment that by using their narrative to frame 
the operation in a positive light, it allowed the Israeli Air Force (IAF) and IDF adequate 
time to continue their actions without the risk that world opinion would force a cease-fire 
prior to the achievement of the operation’s objectives. 
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Unlike the 2006 Lebanon War, Cast Lead was a thoroughly planned and 
coordinated operation with the integration of IAF, IDF, and cyber-space.  Israel launched 
into Gaza with airstrikes on December 27th, and just two days later they launched into 
cyber-space with what one blogger dubbed “war 2.0”151—a calculated incursion into the 
world of blogs, vlogs (video logs), Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, Skype, and 
podcasts.  Israel unveiled their own YouTube channel with footage—taken from 
unmanned drones in the skies over Gaza—depicting precision bombings of rocket-
launching facilities, humanitarian assistance, and IDF tanks moving into attack positions.  
The IDF’s YouTube channel was immediately propelled to the top as being the “second 
most subscribed channel and ninth most watched worldwide.”152  The Israeli consulate in 
New York used Twitter to conduct the first ever “governmental press conference,” open 
to anyone with a Twitter account.153  The NID sought to modify and adjust world 
perception by controlling the flow of information.  They restricted independent foreign 
press in Gaza while simultaneously coordinating online sympathetic groups to serve as 
cyber force multipliers. 
By the start of Israel’s 2008 incursion into Gaza, not only did the IDF possess a 
newly developed doctrine, but the IDF was at a much higher level of preparedness than it 
had been in 2006.  After the failure in Lebanon, inquiry teams discovered that the IDF’s 
doctrine was “completely wrong” and “counter[ed] the basic principles of operating an 
army in general and the IDF in particular.”154  The doctrine had replaced traditional terms 
like “objective” with notions of “campaign rational” and “conscious burning” of the 
enemy, while simultaneously advocating “effects based” operations heavily reliant on 
stand-off weapon systems—mainly airborne—with the integration of ground maneuver 
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forces only as a last resort.155  With the old doctrine deemed inadequate and shelved, the 
IDF proceeded with major adjustments to its training.  For the first time in almost a 
decade, the Armored Brigade 401—a pivotal unit in Operation Cast Lead—trained for 
twelve weeks on skills such as basic crew drills, urban combat, and conventional warfare 
skills.156  IDF reserve forces experienced a rapid increase in the pace and magnitude of 
their training.  Many reservists were returned to their primary weapon systems and 
trained on the basics; their once lacking equipment began to be fielded.  They received 
“tens of thousands of ballistic helmets and vests and night vision goggles, as well as 
significant quantities of grenades, small arms ammunition, and magazines.”157  With the 
IDF almost completely revamped—unharnessed from its old doctrine, properly trained, 
and fully equipped—they were now much more prepared than previously in 2006. 
Despite the dramatic improvements Israel displayed during Operation Cast Lead, 
two flaws emerged in their strategy: their prohibition against international media entering 
Gaza, and their disproportionate use of force, something brought to light by the Report of 
the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (also referred to as The 
Goldstone Report).158  During Operation Cast Lead, Israeli authorities imposed severe 
restrictions on journalists—they were banned from entering Gaza to cover the conflict—
in what amounted to a “total news blackout.”159  Even IDF soldiers were ordered to leave 
their cell phones before entering into Gaza.  The only official images emanating from 
Gaza were produced by IDF photographers and camera crews, images that were then 
reproduced and broadcast by media worldwide.  Despite the ban keeping journalists out 
of Gaza, the IDF still managed to inadvertently bomb a building housing the Palestinian 
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media.160  Since media was banned from reporting in Gaza, many Palestinians took it 
upon themselves to provide information and images to the outside world.  The “army of 
citizen journalists”—armed with mobile phones, laptops, and digital media—was 
immense.161  By imposing a draconian level of control on the media, Israel in-fact lost 
control of its narrative.  Journalists, restricted to Israel, resorted to narrating videos, 
provided by the Palestinians, as if they had been an eyewitness to the action being shown 
on screen, and much of the information presented was unlikely to have been checked for 
accuracy.  Restriction of the press’ access to Gaza resulted in much of the war being told 
from the Palestinian point of view, something Israel sought to suppress.  Very few 
pictures of Hamas soldiers or rocket launchers crept into media reports; instead, the 
public was inundated with images of Palestinian suffering. 
The second of Israel’s flaws during Operation Cast Lead was the IDF’s perceived 
disproportionate use of force.  After the last of Israel’s troops withdrew from Gaza, the 
world noticed that there were 1,300 Palestinians dead—“probably more than half of them 
civilians”—and only ten Israeli soldiers killed (four in accidents) along with three 
civilians.162  In one incident, symbolic of the entire conflict, Israeli forces mortared a 
United Nation’s school in Gaza killing as many as 40 Palestinians, among them five 
women and ten children.  Only two of those killed were identified by the IDF as Hamas 
operatives and part of a mortar battery cell.163  The Report of the United Nations Fact 
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict criticized Israel for targeting civilians and the 
supporting infrastructure.  It found:  
There has been a violation of the grave breeches provisions of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. Unlawful and wanton destruction which is not 
justified by military necessity amounts to a war crime… In this respect, 
the Mission recognizes that not all deaths constitute violations of 
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international humanitarian law. The principle of proportionality 
acknowledges that under certain strict conditions, actions resulting in the 
loss of civilian life may not be unlawful.  What makes the application and 
assessment of proportionality difficult in respect of many of the events 
investigated by the Mission is that deeds by Israeli forces and words of 
military and political leaders prior to and during the operations indicate 
that as a whole they were premised on a deliberate policy of 
disproportionate force aimed not at the enemy but at the “supporting 
infrastructure.” In practice, this appears to have meant the civilian 
population.164 
Israel’s actions brought unwanted attention from the international community urging 
Israel to cease hostilities and discuss a peace agreement with Hamas.  Israel’s main 
concern was the accomplishment of their objectives in Gaza before enough international 
pressure could be mounted forcing a cease-fire. 
C. HAMAS’ THEMES USED IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 
1. Narrative 
Hamas’s overarching narrative closely replicates that of Hezbollah.  The 
diagnostic framing process for their narrative is one of collective action and opens by 
asserting a life or death “struggle against the Jews.”165  This struggle is framed as a 
religious conflict for the lands of Palestine, which can only be acquired after the 
destruction of Israel.166  At the core of this argument is the belief that “Palestine is an 
Islamic Waqf [trust] consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement [sic] 
Day,” and that the “banner of Allah” will be raised over the “Zionist invaders.”167 
Central to Hamas’s diagnostic frame is a well-defined problem identification 
statement and path for Muslims to follow in order to remedy the conflict and provide for 
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collective action.  The covenant clearly states that Palestine is an Islamic land and must 
be freed from the invading Zionists.  By framing Palestine as an Islamic land, the frame is 
inclusive and “welcomes every Moslem who embraces its faith.”168  Hamas’ goals and 
methods for reaching those goals are widely known, especially throughout the Middle 
East, and therefore it can be said that the organization has successfully explained its 
diagnostic frame. 
In their general prognostic frame, Hamas outlines steps to take in order to free 
Palestine.  The covenant advocates violence as the only way for Islam to “obliterate” 
Israel and reclaim Palestine.  It states “There is no solution for the Palestinian question 
except through Jihad,” and “in the face of the Jews’ usurpation of Palestine, it is 
compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised.”169  Even the slogan for the Islamic 
Resistance Movement echoes this modus operandi when it claims “Allah is its target, the 
Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of 
Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.”170  More specifically, on December 18, 2008, Hamas 
clarified their prognostic framing of the current situation.  They announced there would 
be no renewal of the ceasefire with Israel "because the enemy did not abide by its 
obligations" to halt its attacks or allow humanitarian aid into Gaza.171  Hamas leaders 
stopped short of advocating an all-out war with Israel, but unmistakably framed Israel as 
an occupying presence and the cause of Palestinian hardships.  They made it clear that 
Israel’s offensive actions against the Palestinians were the cause of the problem, and that 
Hamas was justified in launching rockets into Israel in order to protect the citizens of 
Gaza. 
There has long been debate over what is written in the covenant of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement and what its leaders say as to which one is more representative of 
the SMO.  The one part of the debate that is never in question is the fact that Hamas 
                                                 
168 Hamas, The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 3. 
169 Hamas, The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 8. 
170 Hamas, The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 5. 
171 Nidal al-Mughrabi, "Hamas Declares End to Ceasefire with Israel in Gaza," Reuters, accessed 
March 12, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/18/us-palestinians-israel-ceasefire-
idUSLI75623220081218. 
 50
subscribes to the use of violence and terrorism—although Hamas frames it as 
resistance—as a means to achieve its goals.  The religion of Islam is the basis for the 
document and allows for its frame amplification, albeit to a small extent.  The 
organization is inclusive of all Muslim as long as they follow Islamic ideology, as evident 
by its fourth article: “The Islamic Resistance Movement welcomes every Moslem who 
embraces its faith, ideology, follows its programme, keeps its secrets, and wants to 
belong to its ranks and carry out the duty.”172  The SMO’s frame becomes restrictive 
when it begins excluding organizations such as the PLO: “the day The Palestinian 
Liberation Organization adopts Islam as its way of life, we will become its soldiers, and 
fuel for its fire that will burn the enemies,”173 or after the end of the ceasefire when 
Hamas began criticizing Egypt and other moderate Arab states for not unifying and 
standing against Israel: “we call upon the Egyptian authorities to stop these strange 
positions which are not consistent with the positions of the Egyptian people and their 
historical positions in supporting the Palestinian cause.”174  Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas’ 
covenant does not have a non-violent democratic appeal; instead it seeks rigid followers 
of Islamic law. 
Within the motivational frame, the Islamic Resistance Movement seeks to “rally 
support for it and its stands, [and] strive towards enhancing the struggle.  It is well-
equipped for that because of the clarity of its ideology, the nobility of its aim and the 
loftiness of its objectives.”175  By framing their struggle in the context of religion it 
provides moral support to the SMO’s goals, regulates compromise, and rallies others 
from the same faith behind the objectives. 
Hamas’ overarching narrative concludes with the obliteration of Israel, the 
reclamation of Palestine, and the establishment of Islamic Sharia.  Although the 
destruction of Israel and the imposition of Islamic Sharia is something that many of 
Hamas’ leaders have not publically discussed, it is made explicitly clear in their 
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covenant.  The conclusion to their narrative, as told orally, is some form of a two state 
solution with recognition from Israel.  However, the conclusion of Hamas’ narrative 
surrounding Operation Cast Lead ends with a “great victory,” eerily similar to that of 
Hezbollah. 
2.  Themes 
During Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, Hamas opted for a strategy that relied much 
less on the psychological aspect than Hezbollah did in 2006.  The Islamic Resistance 
Movement instead relied on the IDQB and its combat troops, consisting of artillery forces 
for the offensive and ground forces for the defensive.176  Despite its reliance on military 
forces, Hamas was unable to protect its media outlets against Israel’s assault.  Ultimately, 
many media outlets were destroyed, either partially or totally, and transmissions were 
interrupted.177  In the days following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, Hamas announced 
victory; their survival from the Israeli sea, air, and land assault constituted victory.  
Mosque loudspeakers in Gaza City announced a “gorgeous and great victory” that forced 
Israel to “stop its crimes.”178  According to Abu Obeida, an IDQB spokesman, Israel 
failed to achieve any of its goals and instead they “sunk in the sea of Gaza.”179  This is 
the typical style of exaggerated claims and propaganda that Hamas proffered during Cast 
Lead. 
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During Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, Hamas attempted to convey one 
main theme: Hamas is the Palestinian protector.  Immediately after Israel’s withdrawal 
Hamas began promoting another theme: Hamas achieved victory over Israel.  Staying in 
line with the first theme, Hamas portrayed itself as the protector of the Palestinians; the 
Islamic Resistance Movement described itself as the victim of Israel’s attack rather than 
as the provocateur.  Hamas espoused a conspiracy theory that Israel had been plotting 
war for a long time.  Jonathan Fighel supports this theory by claiming, “The reaction [to 
Hamas’ rockets] was not spontaneous but well planned; it was not reflexive like in 
Lebanon.”180  The conspiracy theory was reinforced by Ismail Haniyah during his victory 
speech on January 18 when he said Israel had been setting the “political, regional, and 
international scene” for its “conspiracy” designed to eliminate the resistance, and the 
Palestinian issue; “This is a war our people was [sic] forced into with no choice.”181  By 
promoting and perpetuating the conspiracy theory theme, Hamas successfully played the 
politics of victimhood, which garnered additional support for its cause. 
Within the protector theme, Hamas stressed two important sub-themes: Israel 
purposely targets civilians, and Hamas protects civilians.  Hamas ensured its media 
coverage—those stations that were still broadcasting after the IAF’s attacks—depicted 
images of destruction along with graphic scenes of civilians injured or killed by the IDF.  
The images of dead civilians, mainly women and children, were used to portray Israel as 
indiscriminate, inhumane, and responsible for war crimes.  In a television interview, 
Haniyah demanded that international investigation teams be sent to conduct an inquiry 
into the “war crimes perpetrated by the enemy in the Gaza Strip.”182  Conversely, in an 
effort to downplay the severe blow to its infrastructure and operatives, Hamas refrained 
from publishing any information which discussed the deaths of any of its operatives, even 
the martyrs.  One website went so far as to warn Palestinians “not to publish information 
                                                 
180 Jeffay, Learning from Lebanon. 
181 The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Within Hamas’s Effort to Perpetuate a Victory Myth in 
Operation Cast Lead, its Spokesmen Release False Descriptions about Events of the Fighting and their 
False Successes (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & 
Commemoration Center (IICC), January, 2009).  http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e048.htm. 
182 The Battle for Hearts and Minds, 14. 
 53
on those killed or injured in the fighting.”183  While Israel was framed as the aggressive 
perpetrator of war crimes, Hamas sought to portray itself as the defender of the 
Palestinian cause and protector of its citizens.  To do so, they relied heavily on their 
network of social institutions which provided various services to the populace, a tactic 
learned from Hezbollah which Hamas sought to emulate.  In a televised speech, Mashal 
declared that “[we] have already begun working to accomplish this project—the project 
of rebuilding, housing, compensating, and treating the wounded.”184  Within the scope of 
this project, he promised to provide emergency assistance to families whose homes were 
destroyed or damaged: “to the families of the martyrs and the wounded, and to the 
displaced families who have lost their homes, we will give specific sums of money.”185  
Obviously, Hamas saw the powerful effect this had for Hezbollah and sought to imitate 
the increased level of support.  Hamas’ protector theme served its SMO well as the 
messages drew a clear distinction between Hamas and its actions, and its rivals Fatah and 
the PA and their inaction. 
Even before the cessation of hostilities, Hamas’ propaganda apparatus began 
spinning tales of brave IDQB fighters successfully defending Gaza against a much larger 
Israeli war machine.  Spokesmen for the resistance claimed that prior to Israel’s invasion 
the range of Hamas’ rockets was limited to 20 kilometers, but during the battle the 
rockets were touted as successfully hitting places as far away as 40 kilometers.186  They 
bragged that populated cities, such as Tel-Aviv, were now within range.  Much ado was 
made about the ferocity of the IDQB fighters and their ability to withstand the formidable 
IDF.  Haniyah claimed there were “seven IDF divisions operating in the Gaza Strip, a 
mighty air force that carried out more than 2500 raids, and psychological warfare directed 
by ‘hundreds of experts.’”187  The resistance fighters were portrayed as wildly successful 
in their attacks with videos of the gunmen routinely broadcast on the al-Aqsa television 
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station.188  Although Hamas’ propaganda attempted to portray the IDQB fighters in a 
positive light, there was little factual information to back up the outrageous claims.  
Hamas lacked synchronization between its kinetic and psychological actions and instead 
relied heavily on grossly exaggerated and/or completely fabricated stories.  Without an 
attachment to the facts, the propaganda failed to obtain credibility and influence among 
the target audience.  
After Israel terminated its operations and withdrew from Gaza, Mashal once again 
put into action a plan that was modeled on that of Hezbollah—a “great victory.”189  He 
declared: 
Does it not suffice that the goals of the enemy have not been 
accomplished?  It has failed on the ground, just as it has failed politically.  
Ultimately, after three weeks, it was forced to declare a unilateral cease-
fire and withdrawal, without any agreement or terms that bind or limit the 
resistance.190 
With this theme, Hamas attempted to frame themselves as victorious over the Israelis, 
much like Hezbollah did; unfortunately for Hamas, their propaganda campaign does not 
appear to be as effective as Hezbollah’s.  They repeatedly claimed their military 
capabilities remained intact, their rocket stockpiles were still high, the leadership was 
unscathed, infrastructure was not destroyed, and their offices and facilities continued 
daily operations “even while the storm was raging.”191  In contrast to these claims, the 
situation on the ground was vastly different; Hamas’ military capabilities were severely 
degraded, their rocket stockpiles dwindled, the leadership that was not killed went into 
hiding, infrastructure took a devastating hit, and their public services ground to an almost 
complete standstill—something noticed by the populace. 
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Hamas modeled much of its Gaza narrative after Hezbollah and the successes they 
experienced during and after the 2006 Lebanon War.  Unfortunately, Hamas was not as 
prepared as Hezbollah to execute the plan, nor did they possess the same resources.  The 
themes employed to influence the Palestinian populace were acceptable; however, the 
implementation was lacking.  As will be discussed in section D, there was a large gap 
between the message and the reality that Hamas failed to bridge.  What the population 
saw and experienced was not always what Hamas portrayed. 
3. Broadcast, Print, and Internet Channels 
Hamas maintains tight control over all media in the Gaza Strip.  There is little 
freedom of speech, freedom of press, right to criticize, or freedom to express rival 
opinions.  Those who criticize Hamas or act in any way that could be conceived as 
counter to the laws of Islam are immediately silenced.  In 2008, Hamas raided the Gaza 
bureau of the official Palestinian News Agency (WAFA) and seized much of their 
equipment.  Largely due to the small geographical size of Gaza, Hamas directly controls 
relatively few media assets, but none-the-less it maintains tight control over all media 
within the Strip.  Any foreign owned media, such as al-Arabiya TV owned by Saudi 
Arabia, have a strong leaning in favor of Hamas, and those individuals or stations that 
express any discontent are immediately closed with all journalists arrested and 
audiovisual equipment confiscated.  Reporters without Borders heavily condemned 
Hamas in a February 2009 report covering Operation Cast Lead in which a Gaza 
journalist was interviewed and claimed: “Hamas controlled information during the war.  
No open criticism can be made against Hamas.  Journalists in Gaza do not have complete 
freedom.”192  The report provides multiple examples of Hamas’ extreme tactics for 
regulating the media. 
Hamas owns a satellite TV channel, two radio stations, two newspapers, a 
publishing house, and a fluctuating number of websites.193  In January 2006, Hamas 
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launched its satellite television channel al-Aqsa, which quickly became the primary 
source of news within Gaza.194  There are two radio stations under the control of Hamas: 
al-Aqsa and al-Quda.  There are four independent stations in Gaza, but they all broadcast 
under the strict regulation of the Palestinian Ministry of Islamic Endowments.195  Two 
newspapers, Felesteen and al-Risala, are owned and operated by Hamas.  Al-Risala is a 
twice weekly paper and the original media utilized by the Islamic Resistance Movement.  
The paper was founded in 1997.  Felesteen was established in May 2007 and is a daily 
paper.  Hamas has increasingly turned its efforts towards establishing itself and garnering 
support through the use of the World Wide Web.  All of its media enterprises maintain 
internet websites, as does the IDQB. 
Hamas exercised rigid control and censorship over all media within the Gaza Strip 
to guarantee they were the sole purveyor of information.  This ensured Hamas could 
maintain its target audience and bombard them with persuasive and misleading messages.  
The SMO realizes the power of the internet and are expanding their influence onto the 
World Wide Web in an effort to garner sympathy and support for their cause. 
D. SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND KINETIC 
ACTIONS 
Hamas was caught off-guard and ill-prepared for Israel’s attack; militarily, 
psychologically, financially, and politically.  After the tahdiyeh (truce) with Israel ended 
in 2008, Hamas attempted, on numerous occasions, to renew it.  As they actively sought 
to renew the tahdiyeh with Israel, Hamas did not expect Israel to launch a major ground 
offensive.196  The resistance had no inclinations for war with Israel—at least at the 
present time—because they were far too preoccupied with their own problems: 
consolidating control of Gaza after beating Fatah in the 2007 elections, providing a sense 
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of normalcy to life in the strip, resisting the Israeli blockade, and proving they could 
provide a functioning government.197  Hamas misunderstood Israel in terms of its 
military capability and intentions.  This being the case, Hamas was forced to assume a 
defensive strategy that relied heavily on the IDQB forces protecting against the IDF’s 
offensive into Gaza, with a secondary effort placed on the artillery arm’s offensive ability 
to launch Qassam and Grad rockets against Israeli cities.198  This strategy, loosely 
modeled after Hezbollah’s, placed a lesser emphasis on the synchronization of 
psychological and kinetic operations.   
1. Military Operations 
Although not expecting Israel’s invasion of Gaza in December 2008, Hamas did 
have war plans that could be implemented once Israel sent its IDF to attack.  The plans 
called for 15,000 to 16,000 potential combatants and 2,000 members of the IDQB to form 
a defense in depth of three layers, with Gaza City being most heavily defended in an 
effort to protect government buildings, the populace, and most importantly, the leadership 
of the organization.199  Unfortunately for Hamas, the actual combat did not unfold as 
planned. 
Despite its well prepared defensive plans, Hamas failed to execute its ground 
strategy, in part because Israel had adjusted and refined their tactics after 2006.  Israel’s 
use of bomb-sniffing dogs and heavy firepower provided for a quick advance through 
urban areas and prevented Hamas operatives for employing small-unit tactics, suicide 
bombings, snipers, or kidnappings.200  Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside 
bombs had little to no effect on the IDF’s recently upgraded armored vehicles which 
moved quickly through the kill zones.201  Hamas operatives failed to successfully and 
decisively engage the IDF.  In one case, the commander of Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade 
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was fired after losing forty men and allowing members of the IDF’s Givati Brigade to 
penetrate deep into Gaza; just 500 meters from the house of senior Hamas leader 
Mahmoud a-Zahar and one kilometer from the Shifa Hospital which sheltered Ismail 
Haniyeh and most of the organization’s leadership.202  According to Mohammed Najib, a 
Jane’s Defence Weekly correspondent, communications proved to be a significant hurdle 
which Hamas was unable to successfully negotiate.  Without advanced communication 
systems, Hamas’ leadership was almost completely cut off from the front line fighters 
and was unable to effectively provide command and control.203  In addition to the failures 
already listed, the IDQBs experienced extensive hardships in relation to their equipment.  
Mortars—one of their primary weapons—failed to be of any significant use, their 
antitank capabilities failed against the IDF’s armor, antiaircraft missiles failed to down 
any IAF aircraft,204 and most of their heavy machine guns were destroyed in the initial 
attacks by the IAF.  Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas maintained no integration of cameramen 
with the Qassam Brigades and therefore failed to capture footage that could be exploited 
later.  Although Hamas possessed an elaborate ground defensive plan, they failed in the 
execution after the IDF attacked and avoided any major ground engagements or close 
combat operations.  Despite the obvious asymmetry between the IDQB and the IDF, 
Israel effectively adjusted their strategy, equipment, and training after Hezbollah’s 
“divine victory.” 
There is little doubt that Hamas used human shields during the Gaza War;205 what 
remains a question though is: how effective was this strategy?  Hamas fighters used 
women and children, especially in urban environments such as Gaza City, to provide 
protection during their escape from the front lines, and insisted on utilizing mosques, 
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schools, and hospitals as locations to store or fire rockets.206  Although this tactic may 
have worked for the fighters at the time, as word spread perceptions of Hamas began to 
be negatively affected.207  Whether Hamas used human shields or not, the rising civilian 
death toll and pictures of maimed women and children flooded into the media causing 
Israel’s—not Hamas’—image to suffer.  Pressure from throughout the region and around 
the world began to mount against Israel to halt combat operations. 
Israel’s invasion of Gaza in 2008 pitted two asymmetrical forces against each 
other; the Israelis relying on firepower and armor, and Hamas trusting in the lessons 
learned from Hezbollah during their clash with Israel.  Unfortunately for Hamas, Israel 
had also incorporated lessons learned from 2006 into their tactics and were prepared for 
this conflict.  The Islamic Resistance Movement failed to decisively engage the IDF on 
the battlefield—the few times they did, Hamas was completely out-gunned and out-
maneuvered—and suffered from equipment failures, lack of training, and inadequate 
tactics.  During the battle, there was little to no information coordination and the images 
that portrayed the suffering of the Palestinian people were largely due to civilian 
journalists using new media technologies rather than any synchronized effort on the part 
of Hamas. 
E. EFFECT ON THE ENEMY’S SOLIDARITY AND PALESTINIAN 
WILLINGNESS TO PERSIST 
Throughout the Gaza War, Israeli domestic support to the operation remained 
relatively high,208 especially when compared to the fragmentation between the public and 
the government during the Lebanon War.  According to the Jerusalem Post, 
“Surprisingly, the Israeli media were, for the most part, supportive of the IDF offensive 
in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, most of the Israeli political Left supported the war too; those 
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leftists who did not were largely ignored by the public.”209  The cohesiveness amongst 
Israelis has little to do with Hamas’ strategy and can instead be contributed to Israel’s 
framing of the situation.  Hamas failed to launch any major psychological campaign until 
after Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, when they began propagating their “divine 
victory.”  Without a synchronized plan between kinetic and psychological actions, Hamas 
missed a great opportunity to influence Israeli public perceptions and opinions about the 
war. 
Israel suffered from the psychological aspects of the Gaza War in several ways.  
Once the images flowing from the Strip garnered international attention, Israel was 
pressured into providing humanitarian relief for the Gazans.  International aid groups, 
such as the United Nations and the Red Cross, hounded Israel claiming “access to 
civilians in need is poor, relief workers are being hurt and killed, and Israel is woefully 
neglecting its obligations to Palestinians who are trapped, some among rotting corpses in 
a nightmarish landscape of deprivation.”210  The international pressure exerted on Israel 
forced them into allocating resources towards supplying Gazans with humanitarian aid, 
resources that could have otherwise supported the war effort.  According to Ehud Barak, 
his decision to open the cargo border crossings into Gaza came after “calls from the 
international community;”211 however, in an attempt to reframe itself as a good guy in 
the eyes of the international community, Israel stated that “currently there exists no 
[humanitarian crisis].”212  Jonathan Finer of the Los Angeles Times claimed that “no 
doubt the Israeli government is worried about sympathies generated by stories of 
Palestinian suffering.”213  Whether Hamas orchestrated the pressure on Israel through its 
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media control, or civilians took it upon themselves to publish personal stories of tragedy, 
the fact remains that in the eyes of the international community, and especially the Arab 
world, the Israeli image was blemished—a conclusion supported by Cordesman.214  Not 
only was their image blemished, but they were forced into diverting resources towards 
supplying the Gaza Strip with over a million tons of aid—much of it supplied by outside 
organizations and countries. 
While Israel was prepared with their psychological operations, they failed to 
synchronize these actions with the kinetic.  The failure to integrate the two types of 
operations provided Hamas opportunities which they were able to exploit.  On the other 
hand, Hamas was ill-prepared for the war but during the invasion they did plant seeds for 
post-conflict influence.  Additionally, where Israel failed to garner support through 
civilian reporting (due to their overly-tight control), Hamas succeeded and garnered 
additional Palestinian support through its army of independent bloggers and 
photographers.  Whether part of a propaganda plot or not, Hamas was able to profit by 
claiming Fatah informants provided sensitive information to the IDF prior to and during 
the war.215  Not wanting to exclude its rival the PA, Hamas orchestrated demonstrations 
with thousands of individuals in the West Bank.  Protestors demonstrated in support of 
the Palestinians in Gaza, and against Israeli military action and the PA, citing Mahmoud 
Abbas as appeasing Israel.216  This provided Hamas with additional backing, leaving 
them stronger than ever.  The resistance was able to build its credibility and support base 
through its continued rocketing of Israel for the duration of the war.  The number of 
attacks diminished as the war went on—a fact Hamas will not concede—but the rockets 
never ceased falling on Israeli territory. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Since the conflict, Hamas seems to have fared well, though not as well as 
Hezbollah.  As the ruling party, Hamas continues to maintain tight control over Gaza.  
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Khaled Hroub surmises that “the outcome of the war has left Hamas stronger and with an 
enhanced legitimacy among the Palestinians and within the region.”217  Israel’s incursion 
served Hamas well in that it allowed Hamas to play the victim card and garner 
international attention and support.  The Islamic Resistance Movement was able to justify 
its use of force against the invading infidels and served as protectors for the Palestinian 
people, both in Gaza and the West Bank. 
Israel, on the other hand, was forced into a ceasefire and withdrew its forces due 
to international pressure.  Their emphasis quickly shifted from a military offensive to 
having to provide humanitarian assistance—something they claim was intentional.  In the 
eyes of the world though, Israel’s image is still blemished.  There are accusations that 
Israel violated Palestinians’ human rights, used human shield, purposely inflicted wanton 
havoc and destruction of Gazan infrastructure, and was relentless in its disproportionate 
use of force resulting in thousands of civilian deaths.  At no point during the operation 
was Israel successful at stopping Hamas’ rockets from falling on Israeli cities.218 
Hamas’ propaganda machine failed to function at the same level of integration 
and effectiveness that Hezbollah’s did in 2006; however, it was still able to produce 
positive effects.  The biggest psychological operation initiated by Hamas was not 
launched until the conclusion of Israel’s incursion: the divine victory.  This theme served 
to unite Palestinians behind Hamas while simultaneously distancing Hamas and Fatah.  
Fatah was accused of “supporting Israel and providing it with intelligence,”219 while 
Hamas protected the Palestinians and their land.  Besides the divine victory, it is difficult 
to ascertain what effects can be contributed to Hamas’ strategy of psychological 
operations and what was caused by the Palestinians acting on their own volition.  It is my 
conclusion that a majority of the images that flooded onto the internet during the conflict 
were the result of individual action rather than a preplanned, coordinated psychological  
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operation aimed at influencing international opinion.  Despite this conclusion, Hamas 
was responsible for capitalizing on these images and spearheading the movement with 
multiple appeals to the international community seeking support and aid.220 
Why is it that an organization with an inadequate information campaign can 
defeat a foe that possesses a much more advanced information campaign?  Hamas 
implemented a plan that should have resulted in their defeat, but instead, in many ways, 
they emerged from the conflict looking better than Israel.  Hamas’ information campaign 
was severely lacking; however, they succeeded in rallying international support, mainly 
the Arab world, through a mass of independent, civilian bloggers.  Did these bloggers 
achieve a quasi “CNN effect”221 where their actions prompted international attention and 
forced Israeli policy-makers to respond, or was there a predisposition in the Arab world 
toward “liking” the Palestinians?222  In this situation, the Palestinians embodied what 
many Arabs feel: a repression by the corrupt infidels of the West.  In this way, there is a 
similarity among the Arabs—something Cialdini claims is “one of the most influential” 
factors that can be used to produce liking.223  Additionally, the Arab world, Palestinian 
bloggers included, was subconsciously influenced through previous contact with Israel 
and Israel’s associations, namely the United States.  “Often we don’t realize that our 
attitude towards something has been influenced by the number of times we have been 
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exposed to it in the past.”224  If those exposures are negative, people will develop a 
negative predisposition towards that particular thing, in this case Israel.  Even if there is 
no predisposition towards Israel, their close association with the United States can cause 
someone to unconsciously transfer the negative feelings from the U.S. to Israel.  This 
subject is an area that warrants additional study as it has dramatic ramifications.  If the 
Arab world is predisposed against the United States and its associates, what does this 
mean; for Israel it meant the inadequate information campaign of an inferior opponent 
dictated their actions. 
In Operation Cast Lead, a highly asymmetric battle, Hamas proved that success is 
measured differently for each participant.  While Israel’s IDF and IAF performed 
exceptionally well, and their strategy was well thought-out and incorporated lessons 
learned from 2006, they still failed to defeat Hamas.  By default, Hamas was able to 
emerge the victor, with the support of much of the international community standing 
behind the organization, a tribute to their ability to capitalize on exploiting psychological 
opportunities and not their military skill, equipment, or a master plan. 
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IV. THE TALIBAN: A MODERN-DAY ROBIN HOOD? 
In this case study, I will examine the Afghan Taliban’s225 actions between 2005 
and 2006, in an attempt to compare their tactics, techniques, and procedures to those 
examined in the previous case studies.  By 2005, the neo-Taliban had reorganized and 
refocused their campaign efforts on southern Afghanistan.  For the rest of that year, and 
into 2006, they aggressively contested the national government’s control and the 
coalition’s occupation in an effort to regain their power and dominance.  This chapter 
begins with a description of the Taliban’s background in an effort to provide an 
understanding of the movement and its roots.  Afterwards, the coalition’s strategy will be 
analyzed for its successes and failures against the Taliban.  The subsequent section 
describes the Taliban’s narrative, the major themes they employed in an attempt to 
influence and gain the support of the local population, and the media resources they 
harnessed in an effort to spread their messages.  Following this, I will examine the degree 
to which the Taliban was successful at synchronizing their psychological and kinetic 
actions aimed at the “foreign infidels”226 and Karzai’s “puppet” regime.227  Next, I will 
attempt to determine what, if any, affects the Taliban’s strategy achieved.  Lastly, the 
chapter will conclude with a section recapping the Taliban’s successes and failures and 
the impact they had on the American forces and the Afghan government. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The most popular story explaining the Taliban’s emergence tells us that in 
October, 1993, a group of talibs captured a vast arms depot at Spin Boldak, Afghanistan.  
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From the stockpile they acquired massive quantities of AK-47s, tanks, armored personnel 
carriers, aircraft, artillery, and ammunition.228  Then during the summer of 1994, amid 
the chaos of what can be described as Afghanistan’s civil war, a warlord kidnapped, 
raped, and killed several girls.229  Outraged, but unable to do anything about the events, 
the locals turned to a mullah230 from the frontier area, Mohammad Omar, and asked for 
his help. Omar recruited some of his talibs (the same ones that had captured Spin Boldak) 
from the madrassas231 in Pakistan232 and the Taliban proceeded to execute the warlord 
and disperse his militia.233  This story, retold with slight variations, highlights the lawless 
situation experienced throughout Afghanistan in 1994, after ten long years of Soviet 
occupation and five years of a civil war.  Freed of their Soviet occupiers, the Afghan 
population was heavily armed and quickly reverted back to tribal laws and customs; 
however, control was now based on military power rather than tribal heritage.  The 
enormous weapon surplus created a clash between warlords grappling for control of the 
countryside. Anarchy, brutality, and corruption prevailed; individuals were victimized by 
lawless gangs and bandits.  This is the situation in which the Taliban was born, and which 
they sought to reform in favor of strict Islamic order.  In their infancy, they protected the 
weak, battled the strong, and righted injustices; much like a modern-day version of Robin 
Hood.234 
Over the next five years, the Taliban swept from one province to another in an 
effort to restore a sense of stability to Afghanistan.  In their wake they left peace and 
social order where war and unrest had once reigned; they repaired government buildings, 
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schools, and hospitals, and installed governance where none had existed.  The population 
was overwhelmingly supportive of the Taliban and their accomplishments,235 and within 
five years the Taliban had consolidated their rule of Afghanistan and controlled over 90 
percent of the country.236  However, by 2001, the population’s euphoric feelings of 
support for the Taliban, their modern-day Robin Hood, had largely diminished—along 
with international acceptance. 
Then, on September 11, 2001, due to its associations, the Taliban found itself in 
America’s crosshairs.  In the hours and days that followed, they adamantly denied having 
anything to do with the attacks on America.237  Within the U.S. government, many 
individuals failed to distinguish the difference between Mullah Omar’s Taliban and bin 
Laden’s al-Qaida.  In a meeting with President Bush and the most senior security 
advisors in the White House, CIA Director George Tenet said he thought the two 
organizations “were really the same” and “tell the Taliban we’re finished with them.”238  
Just over two weeks later, on September 27th, the U.S. led military campaign into 
Afghanistan began with the insertion of a covert CIA team, codenamed “Jawbreaker.”239 
Fast forward to early 2002, and the Taliban that began to re-emerge—sometimes 
referred to as the neo-Taliban—did so from the safety of the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.  They are vastly different from the Taliban that 
established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in April 1992, and are composed of three 
main insurgent groups: the Quetta Shura (QS), the Haqqani Network (HN), and Hizb-e-
Islami Gulbedin (HIG).240  Unlike al-Qaida, whose goals are global, the neo-Taliban’s 
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goals are localized, 241 with many of the members acting as on-call combatants due to 
their livelihood as farmers or laborers.  The neo-Taliban consists primarily of rural 
Pashtuns from the Ghilzai nation,242 who had supported the old Taliban, in-part because 
of the Pashtun control they previously exerted over the country.243  Pashtun dominance, 
local grievances, and a patrimonial system244 of rule contributed to the rise of the neo-
Taliban, and by the end of 2005, a vast majority of the Taliban’s old leaders and field 
commanders had joined the neo-Taliban.245 
B. COALITION STRATEGY—“SOCIAL WORKERS DRESSED IN 
MILITARY FATIGUES” 
Let me focus on NATO, which is my responsibility.  In general, I think we 
are not doing too badly.  But we are fighting with one arm behind our 
back. 
When it comes to video, we are frankly in the stone age.  NATO has no 
ability to gather video from the field, to show people what is happening.  
We are also barely on the field when it comes to the web.  And on the 
military side, only 5 NATO Allies have public affairs as a military 
function, with training and a career path for officers.  Which means 
artillery officers are suddenly stuck in front of a microphone. 
As I said—one arm tied behind our back. And the other arm is pretty weak 
too. 
- NATO General Secretary, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer246  
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The counter-insurgency effort in Afghanistan was formed through a 
conglomeration of countries and organizations whose strategies varied as much as their 
languages.  The U.S. forces, consisting primarily of Special Operations soldiers, 
spearheaded the incursion into Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  
They, in-turn, were reinforced by a coalition of soldiers from 37 other nations, all limited 
in various ways by their country’s policy makers.247  The multitude of forces received 
direction and guidance from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)248 until 
August 11, 2003 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed 
command.249  Still playing a major role, ISAF’s mission was continually expanded, and 
by the end of 2006 they were responsible for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in 
four Regional Commands (RC) of Afghanistan.  Last, but not least, there are the Afghan 
components: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) composed of the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF), and the Afghan National Police (ANP).  
In the early years of the war the Afghan components played minor roles; however, as 
time passed their responsibilities increased dramatically. 
As highlighted by David Betz, “the most strategically debilitating aspect of the 
Afghan campaign has always been the incoherence of the mission’s purpose.”250  War 
requires a more comprehensible narrative than punishing those who attacked the United 
States on September 11, and without it there is no foundation for strategy, policy, or 
action.251  Betz goes on to note that “the campaign in Afghanistan suffers from diverse 
and often contradictory narratives…For the United States the war is about 9/11…For 
most of the rest of the coalition the war is about the coherence of NATO and the 
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relationship with the United States.”252  Unfortunately, it has been pitifully obvious that 
the Taliban were beating the coalition at the information campaign, something 
acknowledged by Donald Rumsfeld in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in 
2006.253 
In the beginning of 2005, the United Nations dictated a vague allocation of 
responsibilities, as opposed to a specific strategy, for the coalition forces in Afghanistan.  
According to the concept, the U.S. was responsible for training the ANA, the Japanese 
were responsible for demobilizing private militias, the Germans were responsible for 
training the ANP, the Italians were responsible for developing a new judicial system, and 
the British were responsible for leading the drug eradication program.254  Although this 
may have sounded good on paper, it was quickly deemed impracticable and devolved into 
chaos.  From the shambles, ISAF issued a new strategy, if it can be called that, and 
shifted away from large “clear and sweep”255 operations to instead focus on fighting a 
“war of ideas” and “balancing kinetic and nonkinetic activity.”256  In what is now part of 
the rhetoric of the war in Afghanistan, the “hearts and minds” strategy “center[ed] on 
winning the allegiance of the population,” commonly referred to as the “center of 
gravity,”257 through the employment of smaller village-focused operations.  Despite the 
overarching “strategy,” the multitude of nations produced heterogeneous results with its 
implementation.  British forces located in the southern province of Helmand continued to 
be focused on the kinetic fight, while “aid and development functions [were] 
fundamentally absent.”258  Canadian forces elected to concentrate on the three Ds: 
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defense, diplomacy, and development, which “proved unbalanced, with an offensive 
‘defence’ far overarching any development effort.”259  German forces acted as “social 
workers dressed in military fatigues” rather than “fighters trained to kill other human 
beings.”260  And for the U.S. forces, a “softer attitude was adopted, involving 
communicating with the local population, building schools, digging wells and clinics.”261  
I have found no evidence suggesting an overarching, unified coalition strategy for the 
2005–2006 timeframe; thus, it is impossible to determine the impact.  Since a grand 
strategy is absent, it may be beneficial to instead focus on how various military forces 
interpreted and implemented the U.N.’s allocation of responsibilities within each RC. 
U.S. forces found the effort to train the ANA plagued with difficulties: low 
literacy rates, desertions, lower than expected re-enlistments, poor recruiting practices, 
and a lack of funding.262  In an effort to combat this and ensure the high quality of 
soldiers, the training rate was slowed and the training capacity was reduced.263  Outside 
of their training mandate, U.S. forces began seeing an increased level of cooperation from 
the local villagers in and around Kandahar,264 yet throughout the country they were 
more-and-more involved in increasingly fierce combat.265  Despite this fact, Major 
General Eric Olson, commander of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-76, stated that 
“the Taliban is a force in decline.”266  U.S. troops attributed the decline to a strategy of 
nation building and their “hearts and minds” campaign, although direct action missions 
contributed significantly.  Rather than focusing solely on killing insurgents, the 
Americans began working to bring a better life to the people of Afghanistan.  Local 
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clinics were erected and U.S. medics began treating Afghan locals.  Contact was made 
with village elders and relationships began to form. Through these contacts, Americans 
began liberally distributing cash intended for building bridges, wells, irrigation systems, 
and various other infrastructure projects; however, there is debate as to whether this cash 
aided with the intended purpose or was funneled to the neo-Taliban.267  Despite the fact 
that American forces conducted fierce kinetic actions during 2005–2006, American 
officials claim that “winning over the Afghans by piecing together their war-shattered 
country has done more to weaken the Taliban…than any military operation.”268 
The British approach in the south was similar to that of the Americans—a tit-for-
tat strategy that attempted to entice local Afghans to provide information on the neo-
Taliban by offering development benefits to villages.  One of the ways this was done was 
through the implementation of the Quick Impact Project (QIP) program.  The results of 
the program have been varied and the feedback mixed.269  Mohammad Daoud, then the 
governor of Helmand, said the QIP team “had no contact with Afghan government 
departments or the tribal elders of the province.  Their QIP projects I called SIP projects: 
Slow Impact Projects.”270  Meanwhile, British officials claimed that QIP teams were on 
course to spend their full budget (£6.5 million) and stated that “we are trying to work 
within the Afghan system rather than circumvent it because the ultimate exit strategy is 
one where the Afghans can provide the solution to what is an Afghan problem.”271 
Another strategy used by the British to entice Afghans to report on the neo-Taliban was 
to offer tractors to villages that cooperated; again, this was met with mixed results.272  
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One area in which the British approach differed from that of the Americans was when it 
came to the issue of poppy eradication—their primary charge.  Although both sides have 
waffled over their stance on the issue, the Americans largely favored eradication while 
the British opted to leave the poppy growers alone.  The British were concerned that the 
eradication of poppy fields would alienate poor farmers with no other choice of 
livelihood and drive them to support the neo-Taliban.273  Although supposedly following 
the same overarching “strategy” as the Americans, the British tended to be much more 
concerned with “winning hearts and minds” and employed a much softer approach in 
dealing with Afghans. 
Lacking a clear narrative, the coalition is muddled and confused as to their 
direction.  The fact that NATO has “yet to develop an internal consensus about their 
strategy and mission in Afghanistan”274 contributes greatly to the turmoil at all levels of 
operation.  Nations squabble over the definition of terms such as security, reconstruction, 
nation-building, and combat operations, while at the tactical level some units apply harsh 
tactics, even to the point that they have been criticized for abuse and torture of 
Afghans,275 while other units seek to influence Afghans’ through “hearts and minds” 
programs.  The result is a coalition whose modus operandi is devoid of strategic or 
operational synchronization.   The haphazard manner in which coalition forces execute 
their assigned missions contributes to the insurgency by way of inciting revenge, 
increasing neo-Taliban recruitment, and reducing levels of cooperation.276  Even the 
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announcement of a “strategic partnership”277 in May 2005, by Presidents Bush and 
Karzai, contributed little to the clarification of a guiding strategy for coalition forces in 
Afghanistan. 
C. NEO-TALIBAN’S THEMES USED IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 
1. Narrative 
According to Glenn Robinson, “to effectively popularize its ideology, a social 
movement must be able to provide clear summations of its ideology that resonate with its 
target audience.  Such cultural framings represent the popular, bumper-sticker version of 
the broader ideology of the movement;”278 something the neo-Taliban has done by 
revising their narrative into what it is today, a Robin Hoodesque story.  In an attempt to 
utilize folklore and historical battles to their advantage, the neo-Taliban labeled their 
fighters mujahideen;279 a term which resonates well with Afghans and appeals to 
Muslims worldwide.  The mujahideen’s struggle is a fight to expel the foreign invaders of 
Afghanistan so that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—based on sharia—can be 
reestablished, thus ending corruption and lawlessness, and ushering in an era of peace for 
the people of Afghanistan.  According to Afghan political analyst Jelani Zwak, “people in 
provinces and tribal areas mostly accept this narrative, that [the Americans] are leaving 
Afghanistan and the Taliban is coming back.”280  
At the core of the neo-Taliban’s diagnostic frame is the lawlessness, corruption, 
and collective struggle of the Afghan people, all caused by infidels and their attack on 
Islam.  According to Vlahos, this is a “deeply coded Muslim counter-narrative” to the 
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west that is “apocalyptic in nature, going back to Islam’s 7th century origins.”281  Foreign 
troops are portrayed as invaders and an “occupying force, bent on robbing Afghanistan of 
its sovereignty, culture, and religion.”282  Any Afghan who assists the foreigners or 
works with their “puppet government” in Kabul automatically gets lumped into the 
category with the infidels, and therefore shares in the assignment of blame within the 
prognostic frame of the narrative.  In this way, the neo-Taliban attempt to prevent 
individuals from acting in ways which would counter their movement and its goals. 
Zabiullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the neo-Taliban, summed up their prognostic 
frame in an interview when he said “The policy is quite clear.  We ask from the 
beginning and we say once again to enforce the sharia law and Islamic government in 
Afghanistan, to remove foreign forces from our country.”283  Although not necessarily 
part of their narrative, the neo-Taliban’s Layeha284 clearly explains the methods, strategy, 
and rules to follow for the infidel’s expulsion and subsequent sharia enforcement by an 
Islamic government.  Mujahid explains the neo-Taliban’s tactics for ousting the invaders: 
“I want to tell you clearly we have different kinds of tactics.  One of them is the suicide 
attack.  We will not target everyone with a suicide attack…When we need a target attack 
we will do a target attack, when we need a bomb blast we will do the bomb blast.  When 
there is the combat war, we will do it in that place.”285   
Although the neo-Taliban seeks to rally support for the expulsion of foreign 
invaders, they limit their prognostic frame to the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan; 
in this way their narrative varies greatly from that of al-Qaeda.  Fawaz Gerges suggests 
that the Taliban has never been focused beyond the borders of Afghanistan and “had no 
intention or desire to…wage global jihad;”286 an assessment confirmed by Mujahid when 
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he said, “We do not want to interfere in the Pakistan Taliban affairs.  We are Afghan 
Taliban and our policy is clear against the foreign troops…Taliban is one thing and al-
Qaeda is another.  They are global we are just in the region.”287  The neo-Taliban’s 
successful prognostic frame resonance has ensured that opposition to foreign troops is 
“due to a perceived attack on Islam but it is an attack that is perceived to be happening 
within the country by foreign forces.”288  Due to their ability to successfully bridge two 
different frames—the expulsion of foreign invaders and the insurgency’s restriction of 
violence to the boundaries of Afghanistan—the neo-Taliban have created frame 
alignment in the minds of their supporters, and potential supporters, thus producing frame 
resonance.289  Because of the high degree of frame resonance and by limiting their goals 
to Afghanistan, the neo-Taliban actually provides increased frame amplification and 
seeks to ensure improved mobilization in support of their insurgent movement.  The 
nationalistic goals serve to enlist the support of a larger number of Afghans because the 
population can more easily identify with the goals and they resonate well.  Once the 
population is mobilized and has successfully driven out the invaders, then an Islamic 
government can be created and sharia enforced.  “Defensive jihads against a Christian 
onslaught…will continue until the ‘defeat of the crusaders’ army’ and ‘the establishment 
of a pure Islamic State’.  This jihad, according to the narrative, is a collective 
responsibility of all Muslims.”290  By incorporating the concept of an Islamic State into 
their narrative, the neo-Taliban successfully create a high degree of frame resonance with 
all Muslims, and are able to apply cosmic coercive pressures toward those with whom the 
frame fails to resonate. 
The neo-Taliban’s clearly defined problem statement serves as a call to collective 
action for all Muslims and acts as their motivational frame as well.  Since the invading 
infidels are portrayed as blood thirsty war mongers who seek to terrorize the population, 
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disrespect women, and destroy the religion of Islam, “good Muslims” are pressured into 
supporting the movement and its jihad as the only viable alternative to resist the foreign 
occupation.  Within this narrative of “cosmic war,”291 Islam is consumed in a divine 
struggle against the infidels and those who associate with them, such as the Karzai 
government.  By framing their struggle in the light of Islam, the neo-Taliban is able to 
declare their purpose “just,” and their cause “holy.”  “It is an Islamic movement that does 
not recognize tribal, ethnic or linguistic boundaries.”292  According to Mullah Omar, 
“Our religion enjoins on us to avoid from indulging in any kind of activity involving 
prejudices based on ethnicity.  The only bond, which binds us, is the bond is Islam.”293  
Not only does Islam serve to unify the insurgency, but it also amplifies their frame and 
garners increased support for their cause—it helps that many Muslims view the 
occupation as temporary. 
2. Themes 
The neo-Taliban closely modeled their themes around the various frames of their 
narrative in an effort to successfully exploit situations, ideas, and grievances that already 
possess varying degrees of traction within the Afghan public.  Although they may skew 
the facts, exaggerate the numbers, and revise the situation, the final story contains an 
underlying theme which, at a minimum, serves to rally support against the occupation, 
and if successful, in favor of the neo-Taliban.  The main themes employed by the 
insurgency movement are core issues that easily invoke deep-seated emotions 
unrestrained by tribal affiliation or language.  “Such was the starting point from which 
the Taliban began its outreach, feeding on local grievances but increasingly showing 
confidence and a sense of momentum.”294  Within the neo-Taliban’s psychological 
operations arsenal during 2005-2006, there were three main themes, some containing up 
to two sub-themes. 
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The first theme used by the neo-Taliban to sway Afghan support in favor of the 
movement’s cause is the “time-honoured Afghan practice of attacking foreign 
influence—a xenophobic message that has historically resonated with the Afghan 
people—which the Karzai government and the Americans represent in the eyes of the 
Taliban.”295  To reinforce this theme, the neo-Taliban relies on a sense of nationalism, 
and the long standing Afghan tradition which “dictates that foreign forces will be resisted 
to the last”296—similar frames as those contained in their narrative.  The neo-Taliban’s 
messages also exploit suspicions by relying on embedded conventions that dictate that 
foreigners are not to be trusted.  Subordinate to, yet supporting of, this theme is the 
premise that foreign troops are killing Afghan civilians, particularly women and children.  
Allegations of abuse and overreaction by foreigners, who have never been held publically 
accountable, are often exaggerated and repeated.  “Civilian deaths resonate enormously 
in communities, particularly given the terrible memories of Soviet bombing 
campaigns.”297  As foreign forces increase the number of public engagements, the neo-
Taliban is afforded a greater number of examples which they are able to exaggerate, 
twist, and exploit for their benefit. 
The second psychological theme—borrowed from their diagnostic frame—
employed by members of the neo-Taliban is one of legitimacy, authority, and power; the 
Karzai government is illegitimate, the Taliban possess the authority to remedy the 
situation, and the Taliban maintain the power over the infidels.  The government in Kabul 
is portrayed as corrupt, inefficient, and “a puppet of the Western powers, with much 
imagery based on the ‘green dollars’ paid to those who work with the international 
community.”298  Central to this theme is a cosmic war where Karzai and his puppet 
government are lumped into the category of infidels due to their association with the 
crusaders—Western governments.  Conversely, the Neo-Taliban depicts themselves as 
true Muslims and righteous followers of the Prophet Muhammad.  Through these two 
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portrayals, the neo-Taliban is able to claim the moral authority to remedy the situation 
and expel the infidel occupiers.  The neo-Taliban continually portrays the international 
force as weak, while portraying themselves as strong.  For the Afghan populace, the neo-
Taliban are able to create the illusions that: they are everywhere while coalition forces are 
restricted by their bases, they can attack the infidels at a time and place of their choosing 
while the infidels are limited by what they can find, and they have the ability to wait for 
the international forces’ withdrawal—although, this last one may be closer to a reality.  
Neo-Taliban mullahs “are fond of saying that ‘the Americans have the wristwatches, but 
we have the time.’”299  The issue of endurance over time is used to instill fear into the 
locals and discourage anyone from providing support to the foreign forces or the Karzai 
government, for which the penalty is usually death.300  Within this theme, there are 
undertones of international Muslim support for the mujahideen’s cause.  These messages 
are typically aimed at western audiences and serve to bolster the credibility of other neo-
Taliban messages.301  Rising discontent, among the Afghans, with the corruption and 
inefficiency of the Karzai regime fuels grievances and serves to lend credibility to this 
theme.  In contrast to the bleak outlook portrayed of the Afghan puppet government and 
their infidel puppet masters, the neo-Taliban describe themselves as the legitimate and 
righteous champions, unwavering in their commitment, dedicated to rid Afghanistan of 
infidels. 
The last theme espoused by the neo-Taliban is a call to jihad.  This is a broad 
appeal, based on Islamic tenets, to all Muslims to assist and support their mujahideen 
brothers in the fight against the infidels; stems from the neo-Taliban’s prognostic frame.  
A 2003 public statement issued by the neo-Taliban, “stipulated that it was every 
Muslim’s duty to wage jihad…against the U.S. forces.”302  By using Islam as the basis  
 
 
                                                 
299 Johnson, The Taliban Insurgency, 327. 
300 Johnson, The Taliban Insurgency, 339. 
301 Nissen, The Taliban’s Information Warfare, 7. 
302 Amin Tarzi, "Rise of the Neo-Taliban," The Albion Monitor, August 8, 2005. 
 80
for this theme, the mujahideen seek to justify their request as a mandatory duty of all 
Muslims.  Commanders utilize this theme in an attempt to motivate the population in a 
call to arms, much like Mansoor Dadullah did when he said: 
I have a message to the Afghan people and to all Muslims: They must 
continue to wage jihad, wherever they may be – whether it is jihad of the 
pen, of the tongue, of the sword, or of money.  What is important is that 
they continue with the jihad, because it is an individual duty incumbent 
upon all Muslims.303 
Waging jihad, or at least the support thereof, is the final theme communicated by the neo-
Taliban in an effort to promote their insurgency and garner additional support. 
The neo-Taliban utilizes the low literacy rate, shallow media saturation, and rural 
conditions to augment their reliance on historical prejudices common among the Afghan 
population.  Their psychological themes distort, in order to exploit, these biases in an 
attempt at swaying allegiances and accumulating support for their movement.  Although 
the neo-Taliban has added and removed themes from their arsenal over time, these three 
themes have been consistently utilized, especially during the period being analyzed. 
3. Broadcast, Print, and Internet Channels 
Given the low literacy rate in Afghanistan, it could easily be assumed that the 
neo-Taliban is limited in their message delivery means; however, this would be a poor 
assumption.  Surprisingly, they have created a modern, technologically advanced 
communications apparatus which had enabled, and enhanced, the communication of their 
messages to all corners of Afghanistan, and beyond, through a growing range of media 
formats, spanning from low to high tech.  Neo-Taliban messages have been heard on: 
phones, radios, CDs, DVDs, audio cassettes, MP3s, and loudspeakers; they have been 
read on: shabnamah,304 pamphlets, leaflets, magazines, and newspapers; and they have 
been viewed on the: television, Internet, and in person.  With such a broad range of 
medium at their disposal, it is no wonder why the highly dispersed insurgency movement 
                                                 
303 Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?, 24. 
304 Johnson, The Taliban Insurgency, 317–344. Shabnamah are commonly known as night letters. 
 81
has produced “notable contradictions in…messaging,” and lacks a “clear vision of their 
objectives beyond forcing foreign forces to withdraw.”305  Despite these inconsistencies, 
the neo-Taliban has adapted their dissemination methods extremely well to the available 
21st century technologies. 
After an ijtihad,306 the neo-Taliban began to rely heavily on the press, typically 
radio, television, and newspaper reports (things the Taliban used to ban), to advertise 
their often exaggerated operations.  French Defense Minister Herve Morin astutely noted 
that the neo-Taliban understand “that public opinion is probably the Achilles’ heel” of the 
international community.307  In an attempt to manipulate public opinion, commanders, 
and especially spokesmen for the neo-Taliban, ensure they are in constant contact with 
both international and regional media, often providing personal cell or satellite phone 
numbers to ease communication.308  In addition to advertising their operations, the neo-
Taliban has utilized the media to disseminate their layeha to their fighters.309 
Within the neo-Taliban’s wide arsenal of paper media, their use of the traditional 
shabnamah is most notable for introducing compliance.  Shabnamah are a “well-tested, 
cost-effective method of instruction and intimidation,” and are usually posted at night to 
the walls of mosques or government buildings where there is an educated target audience 
willing to read the shabnamah to the illiterate villagers.310  Besides the overt message 
stated in the shabnamah, this form of communication also serves to warn the local 
populace that the neo-Taliban is operating in the area.  Not to be limited to this one 
method of printed communication, the neo-Taliban also rely on six monthly magazines 
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(Sirk, ‘Azm, Istaqamat, al Somood, Mujahid Ghag, and Tawakkal), two quarterly 
magazines (Murshal and Tora Bora), and two weekly newspapers (ad-Dami^r and 
Basoun), as well as various other pamphlets, leaflets, and books.311  These publications 
are available in a variety of languages and although many of them list an Afghan address, 
“it is likely that production is done in Pakistan, possibly in Peshawar and Quetta.”312  
Although some of the above-mentioned periodicals are not officially sanctioned by the 
neo-Taliban, “the supervisors and those who published and established these 
media/informational publications are journalists and followers of the Islamic Emirate, 
even if they prefer to publish these magazines and newspapers not officially as 
spokespersons for the movement’s media unit.”313 
Largely utilized to recruit or highlight operations, CDs, DVDs, MP4 videos, and 
VHS tapes appeal primarily to the illiterate masses.  This form of media “negates the 
need to the journalist as gatekeeper and offers the advantage of speaking directly to the 
audience.”314  DVDs and CDs are mass produced and either sold or strewn about in the 
same manner in which leaflets were distributed in the past.315  MP4s are produced and 
disseminated by multimedia messaging service (MMS) from cell phone to cell phone, 
something that appeals to the younger, more tech-savvy generation of Afghans. 
The neo-Taliban has attempted to gain control of the airwaves by operating their 
own radio stations; however, their efforts are often sporadic and have been met with 
fierce resistance.  According to Mufti Latifullah Hakimi, a neo-Taliban spokesman, they 
own and operate three stations that broadcast to Kandahar; as of early May 2005, he 
claimed that two of the three “will start functioning soon.”316  Hakimi claimed the 
purpose of radio was to “report on the realities and facts” and to introduce “the goals and 
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objectives of the Islamic Movement of Taliban.”317  Despite the fact that the stations 
have to broadcast from mobile transmitters and only for a few hours at dawn and dusk, 
for fear of detection by the coalition forces, neo-Taliban supporters view transmissions as 
an accomplishment.318  For a more enduring message, audio cassettes are utilized.  They 
often possess a large appeal to people’s sense of nationalism through the use of songs, 
poetry, and stories rich with vivid imagery and history.319  Even if the listeners are not 
supporters of the movement, they still carry the cassettes because they enjoy the music 
and the cassettes serve as “protection” if stopped at neo-Taliban roadblocks.320 
In an effort to reach outside the boarders of Afghanistan, the neo-Taliban has 
learned from other insurgencies and adopted the use of the Internet; although, coalition 
efforts have fiercely, yet ineffectually, resisted this move.  This media has largely focused 
on promoting jihad through official websites, Facebook pages, YouTube videos, and 
Twitter feeds.321  The sites typically are published in a variety of languages, to include 
English, and like many messages broadcast through other medium; the messages on the 
Internet are often exaggerated claims of operations. 
D. SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND KINETIC 
ACTIONS 
The neo-Taliban appear to have a schizophrenic coordination between their words 
and deeds; their psychological and kinetic actions.  They claim their goal is not to take 
over the government, yet they usurp governmental control and influence by holding their 
own sharia courts to resolve disputes.  In a phone interview, neo-Taliban spokesman 
Zabiullah Mujahid stated “one thing should be clear: our target is not taking the 
government.  If that was our aim, we could have continued our rule simply by handing 
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over Osama.”322  However, the neo-Taliban’s kinetic actions contradict this statement.  
They established “their own ‘no-frills’ administration…centered on the judiciary, whose 
services were in high demand in the countryside,”323 and individuals who opted not to 
utilize these courts were punished.  The neo-Taliban has been, at times, adept at 
exploiting weaknesses, while other times they appear inconsistent and disorganized with 
their rhetoric claiming one thing and their violence supporting something else. 
One arena in which the neo-Taliban appear confused is the delegation of a 
spokesperson.  On numerous occasions, “several people have claimed to be speaking on 
behalf of the neo-Taliban, often in contradictory terms.”324  Recognized by the leaders, 
the neo-Taliban sought to rectify the situation by creating a Cultural Affairs Commission, 
whose responsibility is to coordinate, synchronize, and publish messages for the 
insurgency.  As reported in al-Somood magazine: 
The Taliban Islamic movement has recognized the extraordinary 
importance of the news media…It is convinced that the media are among 
the most important elements of psychological warfare-and the war of 
morale, which is by no means less important than the field war.  
Accordingly, the movement undertook to begin its media activity, together 
with its military activity…The movement appointed a unit consisting of 
the journalistic cadres who formerly occupied important media positions 
within the Government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.325 
The neo-Taliban has recognized the importance of synchronizing its words and deeds, 
and has sought to do so with the creation of the Cultural Affairs Commission; however, it 
is still too early to tell what effect, if any, this will have. 
1. Military Operations 
The neo-Taliban has been highly successful when it comes to attacks against 
foreign troops, with the aim to kill, maim, or demoralize them.  Their rhetoric is clear in 
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that they seek to expel the foreign occupiers from Afghanistan, and their kinetic actions 
reinforce their words.  Tactics such as the employment of improvised explosive devices 
(IED), suicide bombers, snipers, and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices 
(VBIED) have exacted a heavy toll on coalition forces.  “The Taliban counted on the fact 
that the international forces would rely heavily on air power to respond to such 
incursions.  This would cause collateral damage no matter how much caution the 
international forces displayed, offsetting any tactical gains such air strikes achieved.”326  
Situations such as this typically result in local Afghan condemnation, increased neo-
Taliban support, and more often than not, an international outcry.327  The neo-Taliban 
was highly successful with this and achieved a high level of synchronization between 
their kinetic and psychological actions. 
When it comes to the issue of the Karzai government and its supporters, the neo-
Taliban produce a low level of synchronization between their kinetic and psychological 
actions.  The messages of the neo-Taliban leave no room for doubt as to how they view 
the Karzai government and anyone who works with them, to include teachers and non-
governmental organizations (NGO).  In their layeha, the neo-Taliban clearly state that 
individuals are “forbidden to work as a teacher,” and that “anyone who works as a 
teacher for the current puppet regime must receive a warning.”328  If the teacher does not 
quit their job they must be “beaten,” and if they still refuse a neo-Taliban leader “must 
kill him.”329  As for NGOs, the layeha states “[they] must be treated as the government is 
treated…we tolerate none of their activities…If a school fails to heed a warning to close, 
it must be burned.”330  Time and again, the neo-Taliban have demonstrated their 
synchronization and enforcement of these statements by burning schools and killing 
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civilians associated with the government.331  However, there have also been statements 
by the neo-Taliban that they “are supporters of education.  And the people who burn 
schools, they are not the Taliban.  They are the enemies of Islam, they are the enemies of 
the Taliban.... Burning schools is not allowed under Islam.”332  The neo-Taliban display a 
level of consistency, albeit relatively small, with their messages and deeds about the 
government and those who work for it; however, when it comes to schools and teachers, 
the neo-Taliban appear highly confused and lack any synchronization between their 
psychological and kinetic actions. 
The neo-Taliban experience a lack of coordination with regard to their treatment 
of civilians—those with no governmental, NGO, or teacher affiliation.  Neo-Taliban 
spokesman Mujahid said, “We do not want to kill civilians.  We sacrifice ourselves for 
the safety of the civilians; we never want to kill the civilians. Also we ask of the civilians 
don’t be close to the troops, be away from them not to be targeted.”333  However, their 
actions are quite different.334  Civilians are killed, and when it comes time to claim 
responsibility for the attack, there is often great confusion among groups of neo-Taliban 
with some claiming the attack and others denying their part in the attack.335  Giustozzi 
defines this as the neo-Taliban’s “(often clumsy) attempt to manage violence and to 
target it carefully.”336  In many instances of targeted killings, shabnamah were left  
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warning the target to cease their activities or face the consequences; however, with the 
killing of civilians lacking a connection to the government, attacks have been 
indiscriminate.337   
E. EFFECT ON THE COALITION’S SOLIDARITY AND AFGHANS’ 
WILLINGNESS TO RESIST THE INFIDEL OCCUPIERS 
Due to the neo-Taliban’s deadly surge in violence, and their enhanced number of 
missions, coalition deaths increased greatly during the period in question.  During 2005, 
the number of coalition military members killed more than doubled from the previous 
year; in 2006 that number was more than triple the number of deaths in 2004.338  Despite 
the dramatic increase in coalition deaths, there was little change to the level of American 
support for the war—Iraq remained in the spotlight.  Similarly, NATO countries 
continued to lend their support for the war in Afghanistan, and even to the point that their 
level of support dramatically increased.  Yes, there was infighting between the coalition 
members; however, it was mainly due to differences of opinions related to strategy and  
not the support for the war.  The neo-Taliban’s ability to produce a dramatic increase in 
the coalitions’ body count did little to deter their involvement, sew discord, or sway 
support on the home front. 
When analyzing the impact the neo-Taliban has achieved on local Afghans and 
their willingness to support the movement—or at the very least, to not support coalition 
forces—it is critical to understand the two main factors linked with the success, or failure, 
of counterinsurgency operations: “(1) the degree of local support for the government and 
(2) external support for insurgents, including sanctuary.”339  At the time the neo-Taliban 
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experienced a “violent revival”340 and the coalition forces felt the “fiercest fighting since 
the fall of the Taliban regime,”341 there appeared to be little governmental security and 
protection; however, most Afghans supported their government and felt it was on the 
right path towards peace.  In a 2006 ABC/BBC World Service poll,342 64 percent of 
Afghans felt that the present government was doing excellent/good work (down from 80 
percent the previous year) combatting the top two problems facing the country: violence 
(33 percent) and the Taliban (24 percent).343  More than half of the population expressed 
some degree of confidence that the parliament in Kabul was working for their benefit 
(down from over 75 percent in 2005), and an overwhelming majority of Afghans (88 
percent) said they preferred the current government ruling Afghanistan rather than the 
Taliban (again, down from 91 percent the previous year).344  Despite the increased level 
of violence, “most Afghans say the government and local police alike have a strong 
presence in their area.  Few say so of the Taliban…[and] big majorities continue to call 
the U.S. led invasion a good thing for their country (88 percent).”345  It is obvious that, 
while free of duress, a majority of the population prefers, and supports, the local Karzai 
regime over the neo-Taliban.  Many Afghans remember what life was like while living 
under the rule of the Taliban and prefer not to go back to those conditions; however, 
when faced with coercion or the threat of violence, this may not be so. 
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Unlike the beginnings of the pre-2001 Taliban who protected the weak, battled 
the strong, and righted injustices, the neo-Taliban have done little to ingratiate themselves 
with the Afghan populace.  Instead, the nationalistic insurgency has conducted an 
effective terror campaign, and at best, a moderately effective influence campaign seeking 
the support of the population against the foreign infidels and the puppet government in 
Kabul.  While forcefully exerting their power, the neo-Taliban has successfully bent the 
population to their will; however, once the neo-Taliban has been cleared out of an area, 
they experience little to moderate control over the population.  In comparing the neo-
Taliban to Hezbollah and Hamas, there is one striking difference: the neo-Taliban have 
opted to stay out of the political arena and instead have maintained their movement 
strictly as a violent opposition to the government and not as an alternative to it. 
Attacking foreign influence, the neo-Taliban’s main theme, has resonated well 
with the population, but only to the point where it has elicited implicit support for the 
movement.  In addition to a low level of synchronization between the psychological and 
kinetic, the neo-Taliban’s narrative has failed to resonate to the degree that it stirs a 
majority of the populace into providing explicit support; something the insurgency 
requires in order to be a viable alternative to the government.  The kinetic attacks of the 
neo-Taliban, against coalition forces, mesh well with their messages calling for the 
expulsion or killing of infidels.  However, the messages have not had the desired result; 
they have failed to produce a large uprising of individuals willing to support the cause 
with jihad—despite the cosmic nature and “just” purpose espoused by the neo-Taliban. 
Although the neo-Taliban has been able to fuel existing grievances among the 
local population and exploit those complaints in an effort to undermine the government, 
the insurgency has failed to produce “a large-scale shift in the mood of the Afghan 
population towards the Taliban as a result of their efforts to influence them.”346   Their 
lack of effectiveness to rally support from the populace means that “significant Taliban 
progress in the northern half of the country remains unlikely…No significant shift in 
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popular attitude is likely in 2007–2008 unless the Taliban are able to demonstrate an 
increasing (and more substantial) presence in the south of the country.”347  Once again, 
the neo-Taliban has experienced only moderate success with purporting its narrative, and 
the synchronization with kinetic actions is poor.  The increased pressure by coalition 
forces has largely prevented the neo-Taliban from following through on their threats and 
pushed the neo-Taliban to increasingly rely or terror tactics; ensuring their failure to 
foment a national movement of support. 
The coalition has been plagued by conflicting narratives, which have served to 
confuse the target audiences rather than enlist their support.  According to Richard 
Hallaran, strategic communication is “a way of persuading other people to accept one’s 
ideas, policies, or courses of action.”348  With this definition in mind, it is easy to see that 
the coalition has failed to make significant progress in affecting the population’s view of 
the insurgents or the Afghan government.  In analyzing the conflict in Afghanistan and 
attempting to discern a cause of the dissatisfaction, David Betz concludes, “ISAF’s 
strategic communications score poorly…It is hard to find fleeting episodes of coherence 
let alone a sustained pattern of it…In practice, none of the ideal elements are present as 
they should be.”349  As long as the narrative is muddled there will be a poor level of 
synchronization between it and the physical acts of war. 
Although the neo-Taliban has yet to drive the occupation force from Afghanistan, 
or to oust Karzai and his regime from power, they are still waging their jihad across the 
country.  Despite the coalition’s dramatic increase in attacks, their narrative is still 
confused and their messages lacking.  An overwhelming majority of Afghans (89 
percent) do not view the neo-Taliban favorably, while 74 percent of Afghans (down from 
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83 percent in 2005) view the United States positively.350  Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
draw correlations between these figures and the actions of either competitor.  What we 
have seen though is that due to an incoherent narrative with low levels of 
synchronization, the conflict between the coalition and the neo-Taliban has dragged on 
into a prolonged stalemate with neither side effectively coopting the population’s support.  
The longer the conflict drags on, the more dissatisfied individuals will become; the only 
question, who will they blame? 
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In this final chapter, each case study is evaluated for its internal strengths and 
weaknesses, and then compared externally to the other case studies in an effort to 
evaluate effectiveness.  The case studies are measured using the following criteria: how 
well did the narrative resonate, was preemptive psychological warfare employed, to what 
degrees were kinetic and psychological actions synchronized, how effective was the 
overall strategy for the organization, and was the strategy successfully countered?  Limits 
and constraints for various aspects of the research are then brought forward, followed by 
the counterarguments to waging warfare psychologically.  Finally, the chapter will 
conclude with a section discussing the implications for U.S. Military Information 
Support. 
B. CASE STUDY COMPARISON 
The case studies of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the neo-Taliban offer three differing 
examples of how the integration and use of psychological operations can affect the 
outcome of war.  Each of the three organizations applied the principles of coercion and 
persuasion differently—some more effectively than the others.  As a result, Hezbollah, 
Hamas, and the neo-Taliban experienced varying degrees of effectiveness.  Conversely, 
each organization’s opponents applied differing strategies, with vastly different goals, 
with the aim at defeating the protagonists.  In all three case studies the opponents 
achieved varying levels of success with their strategies.  Table 1 summarized each 
organizations success and failures as measured against the criteria required to achieve a 
more effective form of warfare—warfare waged psychologically.  Within all three case 
studies there is much to be learned and gained, should we be willing to apply the lessons. 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and the neo-Taliban have all effectively utilized religion and 
the idea of a cosmic war in their framing.  Doing so helped each organization triumph 
over their enemies.  Hezbollah will liberate Jerusalem and “obliterate” Israel, Hamas will 
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secure Palestine as an Islamic waqf, and the neo-Taliban will establish the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan with sharia as the foundation.  By framing the situation as they 
have, each organization has pitted Islam against infidels and in doing so they seek to 









Hezbollah High Yes High High No 
Hamas Moderate No Low Low351 Sort of352 
Neo-Taliban Low No Low Low Stalemate353 
Table 1.   Comparison of attributes from each case study 
1. Hezbollah 
Hezbollah as an SMO has not only experienced success at defeating a more 
technologically superior military through the synchronization of psychological and 
kinetic actions, but also at rebranding itself into a political organization. By painting anti-
Israeli sentiments into a broad religiously mandated struggle, Hezbollah expanded their 
support base and attracted individuals that view change through political means as more 
congruent to their personal beliefs.  During the 2006 War with Israel, Hezbollah’s 
asymmetric strategy was highly successful at influencing public opinion, garnering 
support for the organization, and demoralizing the IDF.  In the end, Israel was forced to 
withdraw from Lebanon, and Hezbollah declared a “divine victory.” 
                                                 
351 It should be noted that Hamas by itself was able to achieve a low level of effectiveness against 
Israel; however, if the actions by the Palestinian civilian bloggers, photographers, and videographers are 
taken into consideration, the effect on Israel was medium. 
352 Without the international support, garnered by the activism of Palestinian civilians, Israel would 
have successfully countered Hamas.  As it was, Israel ensured they bought enough time to allow the IAF 
and IDF to accomplish their objectives, and to that extent, they were able to counter Hamas. 
353 The neo-Taliban has only been successfully countered to the degrees that they have been slowed in 
the execution of operations, and the synchronization of psychological and kinetic operations has been 
hindered.  The coalition has been ineffective at modifying perceptions of the neo-Taliban or the Afghan 
central government. 
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Hezbollah’s highly synchronized psychological and kinetic actions were 
responsible for Israel’s failure to achieve their objectives, and Hezbollah’s subsequent 
growth.  Contrary to conventional thinking regarding warfare, Hezbollah let their 
psychological objectives dictate kinetic actions; they ensured violence was used when 
and where it could most affect the psychology of their enemy.  Their psychological 
warfare unit specialized in targeting non-combatants with messages aimed at garnering 
support,354 but the unit was just as effective when it targeted the IDF and SLA.  The 
messages supported Hezbollah’s overarching goals and were in turn reinforced by 
synchronized, pre-planned kinetic actions.  What made Hezbollah’s job that much easier 
was the fact that Israel insisted on using conventional tactics, espoused no clear narrative, 
and promoted ambiguous goals.  All three facts allowed Hezbollah’s messages to go 
largely uncontested. 
Unlike Hamas or the neo-Taliban, Hezbollah355 used social institutions as an 
integral part of their strategy to wage warfare psychologically.  They were prepared to 
mobilize and employ their institutions when it was clear that the Lebanese government 
could not, or would not, respond to a particular situation.  After Lebanese cities were 
attacked by Israeli rockets, Hezbollah was quick to assume responsibility for clearing the 
rubble, rebuilding houses, ensuring schools were operating, maintaining functioning 
public utilities, and providing visible reassurances to the Lebanese people that Hezbollah 
was ensuring their security against the aggressive Israelis.  The highly effective social 
institutions backed by Hezbollah were crucial to their psychological strategy and served 
to rally increased support for their cause. 
A final factor that contributed to Hezbollah’s high degree of success is the fact 
that they effectively reframed their organization as a political party.  Doing so allowed 
them to amass a much broader support base by utilizing the technique of frame extension.  
                                                 
354 An example of this, as described in Chapter II, is when a Christian woman responded to 
Hezbollah’s support theme messages by giving the organization a $15,000 check to purchase more 
Katyusha rockets. 
355 This is not meant to diminish Iran’s part in manipulating and supporting Hezbollah as a proxy.  See 
Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold our Soul for Saudi Crude, 1st ed. (New York: 
Crown, 2003).  
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Individuals that were unlikely to support a terrorist organization now saw that Hezbollah 
was attempting to work within the confines of the political system to affect change, and 
thus the individuals were willing to lend their support.  Without reframing the 
organization the way they did, it is safe to assume that Hezbollah’s support base would 
have been dramatically smaller. 
2. Hamas 
When Israel initiated operation Cast Lead against Hamas, Hamas was ill prepared 
to defend the Gaza Strip.  Their military capability and execution was severely lacking—
in large part due to the fact that Israel had implemented lessons learned from the 33-Day 
War with Hezbollah.  Israel had undergone radical changes since extracting itself from 
the Lebanese mud and this time they conveyed a clear narrative with the aim of achieving 
very specific goals.   Hamas on the other hand was muddled in their messaging and failed 
to implement a synchronized psychological campaign until hostilities began to wane. 
At the time of Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip, Hamas had a well prepared 
kinetic defensive plan.  However, their execution of that plan failed, in part due to Israel’s 
adaptation of tactics using lessons learned from the 33-Day war, and also due to issues 
internal to Hamas.  One internal issue that backfired on Hamas was the use of human 
shields.  At first, this tactic appeared to achieve its purpose; however, once the use of this 
tactic spread throughout the international community, Hamas was condemned. 
Another aspect of Hamas’ military tactics that was severely lacking was the 
synchronization between the kinetic and psychological operations.  Kinetic operations 
were executed largely independent of, and without regard for, psychological operations.  
It is evident that within the planning, little consideration was given to the effects of an 
operation, other than the physical destruction of the enemy.  Not until towards the end of 
the conflict was there a hint of psychological operations: when Mashal claimed a “great 
victory.”  Unfortunately, his claim was hollow and failed to achieve any significant 
effect; the claim lacked any synchronization with the physical, something the populace 
noticed. 
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Israel saw firsthand the effects of Hezbollah’s psychological operations during the 
33-Day War, so when they attacked Hamas, they were ready to implement their own 
campaign of psychological warfare.  From the very beginning, Israel’s incursion into 
Gaza was framed as a defensive operation aimed at protecting Israeli citizens from the 
lethality of Hamas’ Katyusha rockets.  With all members of the Israeli government 
echoing the same message, Israel was able to buy enough time from the international 
community for the IAF and IDF to accomplish their missions.  This was unfortunate for 
Hamas, who sought to end the conflict quickly.  Israel espoused a unified, synchronized, 
and well planned narrative that was reinforced by the way in which they framed various 
issues.  Doing so created a climate which Israel was able to exploit to their advantage. 
One thing Hamas did exceptionally well, although I suspect it was unintentional, 
was the activation of an army of bloggers and photo journalists who documented the 
harsh realities of war.  This allowed images, videos, and personal stories of suffering to 
escape the Israeli media blackout across the Gaza strip and be transmitted around the 
world.  The Palestinian activists armed with cameras and laptops were the most effective 
weapons Hamas exhibited.  The actions of the advocates prompted international 
attention, rallied support, and forced policy makers to respond—Israel was coerced into 
providing aid. 
3. Neo-Taliban 
The neo-Taliban’s case is one where the organization has achieved little success 
due to the employment of uncoordinated psychological operations.  Instead, they have 
opted to wage a campaign of terror that has caused the population to respond out of 
fear—far less effective than responding by choice.  The neo-Taliban’s narrative is 
adequate; however, their coordination of action and influence is severely lacking.  The 
one benefit the organization has relied on is the fact that the coalition’s performance is 
not much better. 
The neo-Taliban has, for the most part, an easily understood narrative with clear 
prognostic, diagnostic, and motivational frames.  They have achieved frame amplification 
by espousing nationalistic goals—something most relevant to a large swath of the 
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populace.  However, the neo-Taliban’s motivational frame is probably the weakest.  
Although they use religion as a pressure point, they have only experienced uneven 
success.  They have failed to inspire a large active support base for their organization.356 
The area where the neo-Taliban has failed most miserably is the coordination of 
their psychological and kinetic actions.  On multiple occasions they espouse one thing, 
yet their actions are contradictory—the examples of shabnamah could be argued as an 
exception.  The neo-Taliban has even struggled to clearly delineate who speaks on behalf 
of the organization; at times multiple spokespersons have voiced contradictory messages.  
Similarly, on the issue of schools and school teachers, the neo-Taliban has been unable to 
promote one synchronized message.  Instead, in one district the neo-Taliban may burn 
schools, while in a neighboring district they claim to support schools.  This lack of 
consistency does little to promote influence, and instead creates confusion. 
Unlike Hezbollah and Hamas, the neo-Taliban has refrained from venturing into 
the political arena.  In fact, they have clearly stated they have no political intentions or 
desires.357  However, this certainly is not the belief shared by all neo-Taliban members as 
the organization is highly fragmented.358  This, coupled with their tactics, has ensured the 
organization remains firmly established as a terrorist organization rather than an SMO.  
By doing so, the neo-Taliban have severely limited the pool of people from which they 
can draw support. 
To the neo-Taliban’s benefit, the coalition has presented a muddled and 
contradictory narrative with a distinct lack of an overarching strategy.  The multiple 
conflicting narratives have served to confuse the Afghans and ensure they remain as 
fence sitters, ripe for the neo-Taliban’s influence.  The coalition has failed to gain the  
 
                                                 
356 The neo-Taliban’s momentum was decreased in 2010 and 2011, but there is little evidence this was 
due to the kinetic actions of the troop surge.  With the additional forces, the neo-Taliban’s inconsistent 
messaging was highlighted by increased coalition efforts at preemptive messaging.  This hindered frame 
linkage and resonation of the neo-Taliban’s messages amongst the Afghan people—their main target 
audience. 
357 See Zabiullah Mujahid’s 2008 statement: “Taking over the government is not our target.”  
Exclusive Interview, accessed March 15, 2012. 
358 Rashid, Taliban, 279; Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 259. 
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support of the populace to assist with the accomplishment of the coalitions’ mission, or to 
back the Afghan government.  Fortunately, the neo-Taliban has proven no more adept at 
securing the population’s active support. 
C. CONSTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER STUDY 
The case studies examined here bring to light some constraints and limitations for 
the theory of waging warfare psychologically.  Further exploration and study is necessary 
to determine whether these factors have any noteworthy effect, whether that influence is 
positive or negative, and to what degree the effect is significant to the idea of waging 
warfare psychologically.  
Probably the most significant constraint presented by these three cases is the fact 
that in all three instances the protagonist organization is under attack from outsiders—
individuals or organizations external to the boundaries that the protagonist’s organization 
claims as their home territory.  This presents the aggressors with unique challenges as 
they have a tendency to be viewed unfavorably by the populace as foreigners, if not 
invaders.  This situation allows an opportunity for the organizations under attack to craft 
a narrative based on victimhood.359  In his book, Cialdini offers six tactics,360 or weapons 
of influence as he calls them, that can be used effectively, either for or against the 
protagonist’s narrative.361  To differing degrees, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the neo-Taliban 
all utilized the concept of victimhood and experienced various levels of success. 
Similarly, in the case of the neo-Taliban, the Afghan central government came to 
be portrayed, and viewed, as an outsider, or a “puppet” of the invading forces.  Karzai’s 
close association362 with the coalition, specifically the U.S., allowed the neo-Taliban to  
                                                 
359 Juliana Ochs, "The Politics of Victimhood and its Internal Exegetes: Terror Victims in Israel," 
History and Anthropology 17, no. 4 (December, 2006): 355–368. 
360 The six weapons of influence are: reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, 
authority, and scarcity.  Source: Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. 
 361 Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. 
 362 Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. 
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frame the entire Afghan government as being a part of the outsiders’ organization—
adversely affecting the government’s image.  The significance of this is questionable; 
however, it is something that warrants additional inspection. 
Lastly, the limits and constraints of predisposition, as it relates to waging warfare 
psychologically, deserve closer examination.  In the case of Hamas, were individuals and 
states within the Arab world predisposed towards “liking” the organization because of a 
shared similarity?363  If so, how can we overcome the subconscious idea of “liking” when 
we are the outsiders and the ones who appear most dissimilar?  One possibility at the 
heart of unconventional warfare (UW) is the idea of working through indigenous peoples 
rather than spearheading operations ourselves.  Assisting local resistance movements 
would partially mitigate issues of local resonance.  Liking and predisposition for support 
are closely related; further research needs to be conducted on these subjects. 
D. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
There are several counterarguments to the idea of waging warfare 
psychologically, especially when suggesting the employment of this strategy by the 
United States.  The main counter to the U.S. utilizing this approach is “What reasons are 
there to adjust the current way of waging war?”  This is a naive and romantic line of 
reasoning that implies the U.S. is at the pinnacle of excellence and therefore cannot 
improve the way in which war is conducted.  Based on the quagmire, and ultimate 
stalemate, described in the neo-Taliban case study, it is evident that the United States 
must improve on its strategy, especially in irregular warfare.  The U.S. has demonstrated 
its capability to engage enemies on two fronts, and employ unconventional warfare 
tactics; however, this does not relieve the U.S. from its responsibility to explore new 
tactics and methods for conducting warfare more effectively. 
The second and third counterarguments, which can be grouped together due to 
their reasoning, to waging warfare psychologically, are that “only smaller forces can 
successfully wage warfare psychologically,” and “only forces that have the home field 
                                                 
363 Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. 
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advantage will be successful in waging warfare psychologically.” The third counter 
argument in essence posits that local resonance cannot be overcome. These statements 
are inaccurate and based on faulty assumptions.  The underlying concepts of persuasion 
and influence do not just apply in one direction, i.e. from the weaker individual to the 
stronger. Cialdini extensively shows how the “weapons of influence” are so common that 
they are utilized by everyone, often times unconsciously, from automobile dealers, to real 
estate agents, to accident victims.  The principles of influence are largely universal and 
not bounded by positions of strength, weakness, or home field advantage—although the 
effects and individual susceptibilities may be varied.364  One way to counter the 
receptiveness to the home field advantage is to ensure that within the narrative and 
messages, there are locally resonating frames.  This will ensure the clear transmission of 
an easily understood message. 
Combat is precisely the time when the principles of influence should be utilized.  
The uncertainty created by an environment of war mitigates the constraint of local 
resonance and allows for Cialdini’s six principles to be utilized to their fullest.  As 
Cialdini notes: 
When we are rushed, stressed, uncertain, indifferent, distracted, or 
fatigued, we tend to focus on less of the information available to us.  
When making decisions under these circumstances, we often revert to the 
rather primitive but necessary single-piece-of-good-evidence approach.365 
While embroiled in combat, forces are easily confused in the fog of war.  For this reason, 
combat is when the full weight of the principles of influence and persuasion should be 
brought to bear on the enemy in an effort to spare as much national treasure as possible; 
however, this should not reduce the pre-combat influence efforts. 
                                                 
364 See: Robert H. Gass and John S. Seiter, Persuasion, Social Influence, and Compliance Gaining, 4th 
Edition ed. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2010), 384; Daniel J. O'Keefe, Persuasion: Theory & Research, 2nd 
ed. (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2002), 365; James Price Dillard and Michael Pfau, The 
Persuasion Handbook : Developments in Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications, 2002), 874. 
365 Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, 275. 
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E. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT 
What does all of this mean for the United States and our military?  There are 
several lessons that can be applied immediately.  First and foremost, is the idea of a 
strong narrative.  The narrative is the foundation for effective warfare and if it is 
confusing, complicated, or lacking there is no way to lend credibility to it through 
physical or psychological actions, no matter how synchronized.  The U.S. does not seem 
to understand this concept as evidenced by the war in Afghanistan.  By reworking the 
narrative it can become more clearly understood by those abroad who believe U.S. forces 
are only in Afghanistan as occupiers.  Hezbollah successfully demonstrated this idea of 
an effective narrative, as did Israel during Operation Cast Lead. 
Secondly, the United States must inculcate an understanding amongst its military 
forces that all actions have effects, and these effects influence the actions and reactions of 
others.  The military needs to become more concerned with the effects of their actions 
than with the actions themselves.  When we are able to destroy a terrorist’s safe haven in 
Afghanistan via an unmanned aerial vehicle, that is an advantageous situation for us.  
However, if by doing so we inadvertently enrage a village or tribe and polarize their 
beliefs against us then what effect have we really achieved?  A better method might be to 
exploit the terrorist’s brutality and frame our kinetic operations as honorable retribution 
against the neo-Taliban. 
Forging successful outcomes is undermined if the U.S. military is unable, or 
unwilling, to completely synchronize its psychological and kinetic actions in support of a 
unifying narrative.  The unity of actions is not something that can be done incompletely, 
or just some of the time.  To do so will undermine our narrative and breed a culture of 
mistrust and doubt amongst those we seek to influence.  We would be remiss if we did 
not revisit Aesop’s Fable: The Boy who Cried Wolf.  The fairy tale teaches us that liars 
are not to be believed; and, if we let our physical and kinetic actions continue to be 
mismatched, we are bound to lose credibility—just as the boy who cried wolf. 
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F. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The American way of waging war, historically based on the use of physical force, 
is aimed at destroying enemies and their capabilities faster than they can do to you.  This 
method of achieving victory has proven itself effective in almost all of America’s wars; 
however, there is a way to achieve the same victory at a fraction of the cost—waging 
warfare psychologically.  Influence operations have long been applied in differing 
degrees by a variety of forces, and by studying the application of psychological 
operations in combat environments we are able to uncover the best practices.  Armed 
with the knowledge of what works, how, and why, we are able to implement these 
lessons learned to our own operations; the result being fewer lives lost, less treasure 
spent, and winning more quickly.  
The case studies in this thesis have allowed us to answer the critical research 
questions outlined in Chapter I.  The three cases examined in this thesis show that 
influence over the behavior of a target audience does, in fact, lead to more effectively 
achievable political outcomes.  By influencing a population’s behavior, you are more 
likely to be able to garner their support for your cause.  Secondly, we have seen that a 
strong narrative is fundamental to waging war effectively and efficiently; without a solid 
foundation all else will fail.  Thirdly, convincing actions add support and lend credibility 
to the narrative.  Without the physical actions for support, the narrative collapses.  Lastly, 
these cases demonstrate that preemptive and premeditated psychological warfare leads to 
quicker battlefield results.  The application of preplanned influence operations that are 
integrated with kinetic actions assists in hastening a conflict to termination.  By 
resequencing psychological and kinetic operations at various times throughout a conflict 
we can create stronger, more synchronized, and believable messages, thus generating a 
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